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This study was conducted to examine German planning for
Operation Barbarossa and German execution of that operation
from 11 June-31 July 1941 to determine the planning and
execution of counter-C° activities and the effects of these
activities on Soviet command, control, and communications.
Research was restricted to English language sources and in-
cluded interviews with Soviet and German participants of
the Eastern Front, two trips to the U.S. Army Military
History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania and
the Hoover Institute on War, Revolution and Peace at
Stanford University, Palo Alto, California and a trip to
the National Archives in Washington, D.C.
The results of this study indicate no counter-C
doctrine on the part of the Germans and no concerted counter
plan to disrupt Soviet C° during Operation Barbarossa.
This study does indicate a dramatic disruption of Soviet C
during the opening stages of Operation Barbarossa.
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I, INTRODUCTION
"When we stress the significance of the past, we have
in mind, the necessity for a wise combination of conclusions
from history with contemporary problems,"
So wrote Marshal of the Soviet Union, A. Grechko , then
Minister of Defense of the Soviet Union, in the Military
History Journal on the twentieth anniversary of the German
invasion of Russia. He went on to say, "It is difficult to
understand those comrades who underestimate the experience
of the past and the significance of military history.""
There is a considerable effort, at present, devoted to
the study and development of Command, Control, and Communi-
cations, that is, "C-cubed", in this country. A knowledge
3
of the attributes and requirements of effective C is being
amassed and appreciated and the liabilities of inadequate C
are also coming into focus. While some very distinguished
individuals are quite ably attempting to solve the "C
problem", not sufficient attention is being devoted to the
area of countering Command, Control, and Communications,
that is counter-C . This is a very worthy undertaking, in-
3
deed, since the more we learn about effective and proper C
Marshal of the Soviet Union, A. Grechko, "On the
Anniversary of Fascist Germany's Attack on the Soviet




and the degree to which such systems enhance military effec-
tiveness and preparedness, the more we become aware of the
vulnerabilities of an environment without appropriate C «
Cne need only employ common sense to determine that if an
area possesses the potential for such grave vulnerabilities,
a modern enemy would be at work to exploit such vulnerabili-
ties. Friendly forces should likewise be occupied in
countering the enemy's command, control, and communications.
It is the purpose of this thesis to examine past counter-C
efforts against our most probable enemy, the Soviet Union,
to determine the effectiveness of such effort. From this
information it is a further purpose to determine what ex-
posure the Soviet Union has had in the counter-C area with
the hope of understanding their vulnerability to counter-C
as well as their inclination to employ such activities. It
is important to study and analyze the Soviet Union as a po-
tential opponent in armed conflict and to develop a thorough
understanding of Soviet military thinking. Such study and
analysis, of course, is appropriate of any potential oppo-
nent. Of the Soviets, in particular, many are puzzled by
what seem to be illogical measures on their part. Much of
the confusion may be explained by a difference in approach
between Soviet and U.S. methods to handle common problems.
There are cases, however, when the approaches are completely
opposite to each other. As an example, consider the Soviet
proclevity for numerous, simple, but effective systems

while the U.S. tends towards a few complex, high technology-
systems, A study of past Soviet experiences can provide an
appreciation and understanding of their actions and, with
limits, can provide an insight into their military doctrine.
The proper Soviet military experience to examine in this
regard is their most recent military experience of signifi-
cance, the Second World War, A glance at this experience
reveals adoption by the Soviets of many of the facilities
and techniques employed by the German Army against them.
Such adoption by the Soviets, as just cited, serves to in-
crease the value of a project such as proposed in this
thesis in that we stand to benefit not only from scrutiny
of the effects of those German undertakings, but observation
of those undertakings themselves.
Few Americans have an appreciation of the heavy, linger- /
ing impact on Soviet society of the German invasion of the
Soviet Union on 22 June 1941. Innumerable articles, as well
as entire books, have been written on the subject, extolling
the importance of that date in particular, and the war in
general, on the development of Soviet Military Doctrine,
Indeed, the Soviet appellation of that war, specifically
the Great Patriotic War, indicates the reverence that war
attracts and the profound influence it exerts , The official
Russian history of the Great Patriotic War reads in part:
"The Party and the Government recall the terrible
lessons of this early period of the Patriotic War and

presently do everything necessary to keep the Soviet
Armed Forces in a permanent state of combat readiness." 3
Other works on Soviet Military Doctrine and Strategy make
the following comments.
"The great failure of the Red Army in June, 1941
only served to reinforce strongly this determination
to be even better prepared and more vigilant. Bolshevik
thought has always demanded vigilance to parry deception
and to ward off the enemy's attempts to penetrate their
deception . "4
Marshal of the Soviet Union, V.D. Sokolovskii, when
writing his book on the military strategy of the Soviet
Union said,
"The experience of past wars was only used to demon-
strate various propositions and also to confirm new laws
and phenomena of armed combat whose origin could be
traced to past wars. "5
Perhaps just as enlightening is a comment by an adversary
who saw first hand the planning and effects of such activi-
ties as. previously alluded to during World War II. Although
speaking specifically of Soviet installations, Generalmajor
Abberger's retrospective comment is very succint regarding
Soviet shortcomings in the Great Patriotic War. "It is
unlikely that the Russians will repeat such mistakes. "^
"'History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union
1941-T^TS'
,
(Moscow, 1961), II, 11.
4




^Marshal of the Soviet Union V.D. Sokolovskii, Soviet
Military Strategy (Santa Monica, 1963), p. 514.
Generalmajor a.D . Erich Abberger, Generalmajor a.D .
Paul Block and Oberst Wilhelm Willemer, Destruction and Re -
construction of Roads and Railroads in Russia During World





The point of all this is that the Soviet Military has
learned much from its past experiences as well as those of
its adversaries. It is with the belief that the Soviets
have indeed learned from past experience and will, in fact,
not repeat past mistakes that this thesis is pursued.
Pursuant to a comprehensive, effective study of the
Soviet counter-C experience at the hands of the Germans in
the Great Patriotic War, it is necessary to understand the
term Command, Control, and Communications. Unfortunately,
no one full and sufficient definition exists for C . Various
versions of a definition circumscribe the elusive C*3 and
provide some appreciation for it. The Joint Chiefs of
Staff offer the following:
"Command Control is the exercise of authority by a
properly designated commander over assigned forces in
the accomplishment of his mission.
A command and control system comprises the facili-
ties, equipment, procedures and personnel essential to
the commander for planning, directing and controlling




Noted civilian experts in the C^ community have also
contributed to the attempt to precisely define C 3 . Dr.
Thomas P. Rona of the Boeing Corporation has stated in
general terms
,
"A C system is one that handles human generated or
human perceived information in order to support a mili-
tary mission. "°
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms (Washington, 1979), p. 24.
8 Speech, Thomas P. Rona, 1978.
10

More specifically, Dr. Robert Conley, Chief Scientist
for C° Programs in the Office of the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions says :
"Command and control is a process of resource allo-
cation by a recognized point of authority to accomplish
a given ob j ective (s)
.
A command and control system is an assemblage of
elements that exhibits the properties of command and
control . "9
Best of all, however, is the assessment by Dr. Richard
Stark of the Aerospace Corporation that:
"C J consists of two parts. Command control is the
decision making function performed by a designated
commander. Communications comprises facilities, equip-
ment, procedures, and personnel needed to communicate
support information for use by the commander in perform-
ing his command and control functions and to communicate
his decisions to the assigned forces. "10
Not specifically mentioned in the above definitions is
intelligence, though benignly implied. However, intelli-
gence is such an integral aspect of adequate C that one
finds the term C §1, meaning Command, Control, Communica-
tions, and Intelligence. Intelligence should be understood,
then, to be included in a proper C-5 environment. So, one
might think of C 5 as the collection and communication of
information, by a variety of means, which, when processed by
human and material methods, assists the commander in the
decision process. Further, C 3 $I facilitates the communica-
tions and implementation of decisions and subsequent
9 Robert Conley, "Military Command and Control (C ),"
Signal (January, 19 79) , 15.
10 Letter, Richard Stark, 1973.
11

reevaluation of that implementation. Finally, C 3 §I provides
a means of feedback to facilitate monitoring and modifying
or adjusting the decision, or situation, through the facili-
ties and processes just described. Included in the facili-
ties, information, processes, and methods mentioned are such
items as sensors, intelligence, early warning, radios, tele-
phones, computers, messengers, decision aids, and orders,
to name just a few.
If C is in fact to facilitate the implementation of
decisions, the term communications must take on a broad
definition in relation to controlling the means of imple-
menting decisions. Frequently when speaking of communica-
tions in a strategic, nuclear, C° context, communications
are restricted to the literal communication of a directive
or information. Such is the impression derived from the
authoritative definitions listed previously. In a more
conventional scenario, however, one must consider control
means other than the communication of information. Methods
of deployment are clearly important control measures when
implementing decisions involving force dispositions. The
criticality of force deployment methods as control measures
becomes painfully evident in their absence, as has been the
case in several national scenarios developed lately, For
the reason of control just cited it becomes obvious that
methods of force deployment, such as transportation means
and facilities must be included in the C"3 facilities, pro-
cesses, and methods listed earlier to provide the complete
12

command and control of a situation or action required by
a commander.
Specifying counter-C should now be a less demanding
assignment. Counter-C strives to prevent a C° system from
functioning correctly by manipulating enemy C to achieve a
favorable result. Counter C requires:
1) knowledge of the enemy's C philosophy and
architecture
,
detailed operational and technical knowledge of the
victim system,
3) a clear statement of the goals and desired
capability, and
4) knowledge of how friendlies operate and appear to
the enemy.
Appropriate actions, such as eliminating sensors, delaying
orders, overloading C systems or deceiving its users would
degrade a system while total destruction of communication
mediums could completely interrupt a system, albeit while
other aspects are functioning perfectly. It appears then
that achieving success at countering a C system is con-
siderably easier than operating and maintaining one. Con*-
sidered in other terms, one might achieve equal or greater
results with a given amount of effort in countering




an opponent's system than one would gain by expending that
same amount of effort on one's own C J system. The two
commodities are certainly not equatable, we cannot substitute
one for the other. However, a truly effective, balanced
approach must include both since in many situations a de-
sired result can be achieved by either means.
To properly examine counter-C in this thesis required
an understanding of C^I, that is, an understanding of each
of the individual components and the collective sum which
they form. Examining counter-C as employed by the Germans
against the Soviet Union in World War II required research
into the nature of C circa 1941, particularly in the Soviet
Union. First studied were the most authoritative published
sources, for example, John Erickson's The Road to Stalingrad
and Paul Carell's Hitler Moves East
,
to develop an apprecia-
tion for that era as well as the chain of events which evolv-
ed into Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the
Soviet Union. The next undertaking was to examine systemat-
ically archival manuscripts written by German officers for
the United States following the war. While compiling the
specific counter-C3 activities used by the Germans, recon-
3
struction of a reasonable facsimile of Soviet C from
English language sources began. In particular, the publish-
ed Air Force manuscripts were examined, as well as the
Army's unpublished manuscripts. Interviews with partici-
pants of combat on the Eastern Front and noted historians
14

of that period were invaluable in providing an appreciation
for the flavor of the times involved, and reconstructing
Soviet C as it existed in June 1941. The process of
evaluating the effects of the German counter-C activites
on Soviet C° began with these facts and a knowledge of Soviet
Military Doctrine. This evaluation of German counter-C is,
ot necessity, an evolving one, just as is the Soviet C and
counter-C doctrines.
Whenever available, material from both German and Soviet
sources was scrutinized to obtain a truer, more objective
picture. In warfare as in life, a perspective affects
vision. So, what might have appeared to the Soviets as a
detailed, well-planned and well -executed activity, was per-
haps to the Germans simply a peripheral by-product of proper
planning. As an example consider the initial German attack
on 22 June 1941. The Luftwaffe very carefully selected
targets to be struck by the initial flights of aircraft.
Army units also carefully selected targets for attack by
artillery to properly support the scheme of maneuver. To
Soviet commanders unable to communicate with border and
frontier units, such preparatory fires must have surely
appeared as part of a specific plan to disrupt command,
control, and communications instead of simply supporting
fires. Researching both perspectives, in this particular
instance, presented a complete sequence of cause, effect,
and reaction. Only English language sources were considered,
as dicated by the author's linguistic ability, with the sole
15

exception of some archived captured German and Russian
maps from World War II.
Initially, the time frame of interest included the
planning and initial stages of execution of Operation
Barbarossa. The planning stage commenced on 18 July 1940
and continued until the attack on 22 June 1941 while the
period of execution of interest lasted until 31 July 1941.
Although June and July 1941 remained the primary period of
time of interest, the materials available, and the actual
chain of events in history forced this effort more and more
towards the initial attack of 22 June 1941, More planning
was possible for this one particular action than any other
during the period of interest. Events and actions planned
in detail for the initial attack appeared representative of
the activities undertaken by the German forces as the opera-
tion progressed through June and July, 1941, Therefore the
vast majority of time was spent researching and considering
the planning and execution of Germany's initial attack on the
Soviet Union on 22 June 1941.
With a topic as specific as German counter-C in
Operation Barbarossa, there exists a scarcity of informa-
tion, particularly in the English language. Command,
Control, and Communications as a whole, is a relatively new
packaging concept for important factors which have always
been present in military operations. Military planners of
the Second World War, and subsequently their historians, did
not think or write in "C 3 terms", although there is evidence
16

they certainly considered each of the elements individually,
and perhaps in combination. So the task of research was
complicated by a difference of terms. The enormity of the
situation on the Eastern Front completely dwarfs any single
action. Further, many details of the war were lost on the
losing side, but what should have been available from the
winners was severely restricted by the secrecy of the Soviet
state. These factors are mentioned as problems and not
necessarily as insurmountable barriers.
There are also problems which may face the reader. Al-
though the principles of C"5 remained fairly constant cer-
tainly the implemention had changed drastically since 1941.
One must keep in mind that Operation Barbarossa was planned
to be a 31itzkreig and, in June and July 1941, possessed all
the necessary characteristics. Although war on the Eastern
Front continued for almost four years, the initial blitz-
krieg was a very violent, compact, quick, extremely eventful
period in which more was possible, and in fact occurred,
than during longer, more protracted periods of conflict
later in the war.
Designed to achieve a quick victory on a massive scale,
Operation Barbarossa caused a multitude of truly remarkable
3 12
occurrences in the realm of C in a very short time.
Some of the effects were achieved or reversed solely because
12 See John Erickson, The Soviet High Command (Great
Britain, 1962) and The Roacl to Stalingrad (London, 1975)
17

of such a short, intense operation. As short as the time
may have been, the counter-C"5 effects were devastating and
enduring. In considering these effects, and any short or
long-term Soviet remedies, the reader must appreciate two
facts: 1) Operation Barbarossa was conducted in the Russian
homeland, and 2) Russia was an expansive, rural country.
For those who may have never experienced at least a con-
trived version of command, control, and communications in
wartime, it is a beast to behold! As a simple example, con-
sider a private conversation on the common telephone. As
efficient and reliable as it is, there are instances when
connections are difficult to establish, or clarity is lacking
for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is the
operator. Imagine what it might be like when such difficul-
ties lie between a decision maker and the lives of literally
millions. While the intensity of the situation requires
ever increasing communications, often beyond the realm of
human possibility, an enemy is doing his utmost to directly
confuse the issue. As the criticality increases, the amount
of information increases, the amount of reaction time de-
creases, and communications reliability degradates , if it
exists at all, while the randomness of conflict intercedes.
What may have been by design an effective assist in peace-
time can become a liability in war where confusion is proli-
ferated and clarity nullified. Clearly this is an undesirable
situation, the avoidance of which is worthy of intense effort.
18

With America's increasing role in the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) , a confrontation with the Warsaw
Pact becomes more likely and this study therefore assumes
greater relevance and import. Two facts immediately become
apparent. First, committed as we are to the European
Theater through NATO, we cannot gain enough insight and ex-
perience about combat in that region. One very important
way of doing this is to examine closely the advanced techni-
ques of warfare employed by the Germans in World War II
while also studying the Soviet experiences and performance
in that same war. Second, an investigation of the Soviet
military since 1939 reveals a remarkable similarity between
present Soviet Doctrine and that employed by the Wehrmacht in
1941. Indeed, it appears the Soviets have evolved full cir-
cle from being at the mercy of the German attack on 22 June
1941 to assuming that same attacker's preemptive posture!
An understanding of this doctrine must be gained through
whatever means available.
Studying history for history's sake is not what is pro-
posed here, but rather what Marshal Grechko so eloquently
stated, "For a wise combination of conclusions from history
with contemporary problems."
The Great Patriotic War offers a unique opportunity to
study Soviet combat in the European environment while ob-
serving the German tactics which, in large measure, parallel
13 Grechko, "Anniversary of Attack on Soviet Union," p. 13
19

contemporary Soviet tactics. Although this is not an all-
encompassing approach, it provides insight into Soviet
organization and strategy. One must only make the obvious
analogies from World War II C to the present.
Finally it must be said that for many years Soviet
Military Strategy has evolved quite closely in the tracks of
U.S. Strategy. Perhaps now the U.S. can glean some valuable





A DESCRIPTION OF SOVIET COMMAND
,
CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS IN 1941
Although the casual observer may be surprised at some
subtle similarities, Command, Control, and Communications in
31941 was obviously simpler than it is today, and Soviet C
was even more primitive compared with the technological
3level of 1941. The Soviet Union employed C implements
similar to those of other nations , but the USSR's own peculiar
national objectives, society, and internal bureaucratic
organizations influenced its C3 system and made it different
from other national C"3 systems of 1941. Aside from the in-
fluencing factors just mentioned there were others, listed
below, which are particularly important to this study. The
technological inferiority of Soviet C"5 hardware, compared
with German and American equipment of the same era,14 re-
stricted the quality of performance and versatility of
Soviet C"3 . The unique, very centralized political system of
the Soviet Union and the political and military participants
in that political system combined to further limit the
3
versatility and responsiveness of the Soviet C system.
The geographical size of the Soviet Union increased the re-
quirements of the Soviet C system and magnified its vulner-
ability to counter-C activities.
14Interview, Kamill Usfensky, Cambridge, 1980
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The Soviet-German Nonaggression Pact of 1939 gave the
Soviet Union certain reasonable and practical assurances of
security along its western border and very probably dimin-
ished, relative to other required military actions in the
west, the urgency of completing fortifications and support-
ing facilities along the new border with Germany. Although
the Soviet Union was supporting an enormous army and main-
taining remarkable quantities of military equipment in the
western military districts, the Soviet Union was in the
midst of a period of peace. While expanding its own influ-
ence westward, the Soviet Union was conscious not to upset
the delicate balance of peace with Germany. Reconnaissance
flights and other intelligence gathering activities were
pursued by the Germans even as the Soviet Union increased
its flow of economic materials to Germany. The Kremlin
leaders enforced restraint upon Military District Commanders
who initiated appropriate military precautions in response
to the little that was known of German military activity
along the border. Instead of heeding the implicit warning
of German military activity along the border, the Soviets
adopted a rather accommodating posture, even returning,
without reprisal, a German airman captured on an intelli-
gence gathering mission over the Soviet frontier, A TASS
communique of 14 June 1941 alleviated growing fears of the
15




Soviet populace and military of possible German aggression.
It stated,
"Germany is observing the conditions of the Soviet
-
German Nonaggression Pact just as rigidly as the Soviet
Union, in view of which, in the opinion of Soviet circles,
the rumors of Germany's intention to break the pact and
undertake an attack on the USSR have no foundation what-
ever, and the recent transfer of German troops, freed
from operations in the Balkans, to the eastern and north-
eastern regions of Germany is connected, it must be
supposed, with other motives having nothing to do with
Soviet -German relations . "16
A less desirable side effect of this communique was a re-
laxation in the readiness level of the massive (approximately
2,500,000) forces along the western frontier the week before
the German attack. The Soviet leadership in Moscow was de-
ceiving itself about the immediate threat developing along
its western border, a threat it was unprepared to meet.
The Soviet military, still suffering after-effects of
the purges of the 1950s was also unprepared for the parti-
cular, immediate threat developing in the west, A leader-
ship void, from company to corps levels, created in the Red
Army by the purges had not been filled by 1941 since there
were simply not enough qualified officers to fill the posi-
tions available. Because of a lingering element of fear
still pervading the Red Army, officers and non-commissioned
officers were reluctant to exercise their own initiative for
fear of making mistakes, i.e., it was safer simply to follow
orders exactly. The modernization of military thought,






equipment, and organization, begun by Marshal M.N.
Tukhachevskii in the 1930s was reversed following his de-
mise in the purges. In December 1940, after careful study
of the German campaigns in Poland and the West, the army did
initiate a program to reorganize and modernize its armored
forces, but to effect such a program on an organization the
size of the Red Army would require more time than the
Germans eventually permitted. Caught in the midst of their
reorganization and modernization efforts when Operation
Barbarossa began on 22 June 1941, the Soviets paid a heavy
price when overrun by the Germans. Compounding the problems
already plaguing the military in 1941, was Stalin's ominous
mistrust of others. As Operation Barbarossa began Joseph
Stalin was single-handedly making decisions on important
government and military matters, frequently countermanding
orders issued by Military District Commanders to rectify
deficiencies in readiness. Perhaps most disturbing of all
were Stalin's threats of execution for incompetence or dis-
loyalty, threats which were in fact carried out following
the initial setbacks of Operation Barbarossa, With hind-
sight, it is intuitively evident that the problems enumera-
ted above, when added together, were a catastrophic lia-
bility for the Red Army at the moment the German forces
17History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet
Union 1941-1945 (.Moscow, 19bIJ, p. 11.
24

unleashed the aggressive, mobile, surprise attack opening
Operation Barbarossa.
The officer corps of the Red Army was in an uncomfort-
able position at best, but what about the soldiers who
carried out the orders of the Army's leaders? The Soviet
soldier was a simple, uncomplicated individual, largely re-
cruited from a rural, peasant background. Although inde-
pendent thought and action were conspicuously absent from
his military make-up, he displayed superior determination
and adaptability. Soldiers in the Red Army required few
necessities and many actually enjoyed a better existence in
the army during the Great Patriotic War than in their past
civilian life. The closeness to nature, characteristic of
peasant life, enabled the Soviet soldier of peasant back-
ground to choose, almost unconsciously, the appropriate and
militarily correct course of action when his existence was
18threatened. From his experience on the Russian front,
Generalleutnant Sintzenrich, formerly Commander of the 132d
Infantry Division, has made this particularly cogent-
observation :
"All these traits are rooted deeply in the Russian
soldier; military training could teach them to a man
1
8
Generalleutnant a.D . Sintzenich, 152d Infantry
Divis ion - Geomilitary Description of the Western Ukraine-the
Russian Soldier Unpublished Foreign Military Studies Type -





matured in a higher civilization only laboriously and
with difficulty.
"In all operations and movements within a unit, he is,
however, greatly dependent on the leadership of those
above him. Independent thinking, except in situations
involving his adaptability to natural surroundings,...,
is not in his nature. "1"
Although there were cases of entire Red Army units surren-
dering or deserting during the first two months of Opera-
tion Barbarossa, there were also reports of units fighting
until the last man with fanatical determination.
One must also examine the character of the Russian land
itself to appreciate fully the operational situation as it
existed in 1941. The generalization that Russia was a
large, remote, underdeveloped country is not sufficient.
One need only glance at a map of Russia to grasp its immen-
sity and appreciate the number of waterways, from inter-
mittent streams to great rivers, which traverse Russia in
every direction. Such a host of waterways required a
multitude of bridges whose real importance became more
apparent in time of war. Considering the size of Russia,
the underdeveloped condition of the Soviet motor vehicle
industry in 1941, and the extremely primitive road system,
the Russian railroad presented the only means with which
to accomplish the strategic maneuvers required in that








Soviet national communications in 1941 consisted of a
shallow set of communications systems which largely con-
verged on the Russian capital, Moscow. Captain Charles von
Luttichau," an intelligence and later signal officer with
the German Army on the Eastern Front, described Soviet
communications quite succintly as "very primitive but
r • 21adequate for its purpose." Operation Barbarossa, how-
ever, served Soviet purposes very poorly. The official
Soviet History of the Great Patriotic War, with remarkable
candor, simply described Soviet communications on the first
2 2day of Operation Barbarossa as improperly organized.
The Soviet s had designed their communications on a precon-
ceived concept of the type of conflict that would develop
on the western frontier. This concept seems to be one in
which the Soviets felt they would have sufficient forces and
equipment to check an attack conducted at the pace of
military operations they had experienced in the past, and
to seize the offensive quickly themselves. Operation
Barbarossa, with its opening swift, deep breakthroughs was
radically inconsistent with this notion and the Soviets




Capt. von Luttichau has also completed extensive
research into the early part of the war between Germany and
Russia and has authored the first volume in the U.S. Army
series on the Eastern Front.
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Interview, Charles von Luttichau, Washington, 1980
22,

A distinction must be drawn between the individual
communication systems, for example the Military or Party
communications systems, and the various communication means,
for example telephones and radios, employed in the overall
national communications network of the Soviet Union. The
five principal communications systems which served the
Soviet Union during part or all of Operation Barbarossa
have been identified as follows:
The Military Communications System
The Communist Party Communications System
The Commissariat of State Security (NKGB) Communications
System
The Commissariat of Interior Communications System
The Local Government Officials Communications System.
These five systems vary from the Military System which is
precisely definable by the hardware it employed, to the
Local Officials System which is only loosely definable by
the users it serviced. The various means of communicating
over the five communications systems are given in Figure I,
Both the communications systems and means spanned the com-
munication requirements spectrum from the strategic to the
tactical levels as Figure II graphically portrays for the
case of the Military Communication System. When examining
Figure II, the reader must appreciate the fact that no dis-
tinct break in the communication means was defined in the
Military Communication System between the Army and Corps





The Various Communications Systems
( Including communications facilities within each means)











Personal Messengers : Couriers
State (ground and air)






Radio: State radio facilities
State Security (NKGB) radio
facilities
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employed at the strategic level to those employed at the
tactical level. One should bear in mind it was unlikely
that all the means of communications would be used at one
time at any one level of command but that different levels
of command very probably did employ the same communication
means simultaneously. The telephone was the primary means
of communication employed by all the various communication
systems. The Post Office managed state telephone communi-
cations in Soviet Russia and the location of telephone ex-
changes in the basement of postal buildings indicates a
certain degree of hardening of these communication facili-
ties." Concerning radio communications it can be said
that they were of lesser priority than telephonic communi-
cations. High-frequency radio transmissions, however, were
important communications at strategic levels over the ex-
tremely long distances involved in the Soviet Union. Al-
though no one communications system can be cited as superior
to all the others, it is important to note that all five
systems were available to the national leaders who used the
system which best served their requirements at any given
24time
.
With the exception of the Military Communications Sys-
tems, little information is known of the various communica-
tions systems comprising the National Communication Network.
Interview, Charles von Luttichau, and Detmar Finke,
Washington, 1980.
24 Interview, Aleksandr Nekrich, Cambridge, 1980.
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The Communist Party in the Soviet Union operated its own
communication system in 1941, utilizing telephonic communi-
cations on the Party's own telephone lines. Although few
specifics are known, it can be stated with confidence that
the People's Commissariat for State Security, the state
intelligence organization (NKGB) , operated its own system
of communications within the USSR and utilized radio
transmission to communicate with its spy networks in foreign
countries. The Interior Commissariat, which controlled the
border guards in the west, also operated its own communica-
tions system for direct contact between the border and the
Ministry in Moscow. Except for the exchange of information
which occurred at the Ministry level, the Interior Commis-
sariat Communication System interfaced with the Defense
Commissariat Communication System only at the Military
27
District level. The Local Official Communication System
was the least complete of all the communication systems and
probably relied on conversations conducted in person and on
the state telephone network, and messages sent on the tele-
graph system.
The Military Communication System (see Figure II) was
designed to operate under the rigors of war and was, by its







previously discussed. The civilian telephone landlines and
cables operated by the People's Commissariat for Communica-
tions provided the basis around which the Military Commu-
2 8
nication System functioned." Even the armored units
connected to the civilian cables, as the following statement





"The signals of the 22nd Tank Division, for example,
were operated through the local post office, where the
formation plugged into the civilian telephone network
and telegraph service (22 Tk . Div. record, 7.6.1941:
captured document) . "29
Personal communications were extremely important in the
military and were probably the primary means of communica-
tion at the company, and perhaps even battalion, level.
Couriers and liaison officers replaced messengers in the
personal communications role at the regimental level and
higher. Radios were only employed above the division level
except in armor units where radios were common at all
levels.*3 It is very likely that radio communication was
the primary means of communication in armor units with
personal and telephonic communications assuming secondary











*such a view. Poor coordination of communications between
the infantry and its supporting arms was a facet of the
Soviet Military Communications System characteristic of
infantry-air and infantry-artillery communications, although
it must be said that the artillery forces had an excellent
iternal communications set-up.
Due to a paucity of wireless sets and limited experience
with wireless communication before the Great Patriotic War,
many Red Army personnel were not familiar with radio communi
cations and preferred to rely on the more familiar tele-
phone. Radio operators who were trained were extremely
well trained and assigned to strategic commands, corps level
and higher, while radio operators below the corps level
where radios were only used in armor units (see Figure II)
were typically poorly trained and limited in technical abili
37
ty. *" Only in the Leningrad Military District had the sys-
tem of radio nets reached an effective degree of development
by 22 June 1941 to make a significant contribution to the
defense of the Soviet Union in the opening stages of
jl Alexander Werth, Russia at War (London, 1964), p,138,
32 Interview, Nekrich.
*
According to Richard Ogorkiewicz, Armoured Forces
(New York, 1970), p. 99 a Russian armored, or Tank Division
consisted of two tank regiments, one motorized infantry
regiment and an artillery regiment while a motorized divi-
sion included two motorized infantry regiments, one tank
regiment and an artillery regiment.
34

JBarbarossa. The communications section of a typical
staff was known as the node of communications. An army
level node of communications, for example, was headed by
the Army Signal Officer and usually included the communica-
tions equipment and operators, cryptographic personnel,
representatives from the operations and intelligence staff
sections, and political and state security personnel.
Special High Command Radio Communication Units, operating
under the direction of the Signals Administration, existed
to maintain contact between the General Staff in Moscow and
the Fronts
.
No separate air signal service existed in the Soviet
Air Force in 1941. The Army Signal Service supported the
Air Force, as well as ground units, with wire and radio
communications, and in the case of the Air Force, with a
weather reporting system. Flying units had no signal units
assigned to them nor did the area air commands, air divi-
sions, or mobile air bases; however, communication person-
nel required by flying units were organic to those units.
Wireless telegraphy and radio were the primary means of









The Army level node of communications communicated
with the Front and Corps nodes of communications. When
Corps were eliminated on 10 July 1941, the Army communica'
ted directly with the divisions.
35

means such as wire, marking panels, visual and light sig-
nals, and flares and rockets were also utilized. Sepa-
rate radio networks existed for ground to air to ground,
ground to ground, air traffic control and weather service
communications. Although a variety of radio nets existed
to support the Air Force, the signal communications serv-
ices as a whole were poorly organized and the air signal
network was not suited to the flexible conduct of air
37
warfare. Specific wave-lengths were not assigned to
particular units in the Air Force, but rather a complete
wave -band of frequencies was allotted to an army group
area. The frequencies, and sometimes the call signs as
well, were changed arbitrarily, frequently as often as
38twice in one day. Only a few Soviet aircraft were equip-
ped with radios in 1941. Aviation unit commanders were
apparently able to communicate by radio from air to ground
but were forced to more primitive, visual communications
between aircraft in flight.
Radios were in short supply in the Soviet Air Force and
of no better quality than those used by the ground forces.
Only a few radio beacons existed in 1941 in Russia, and
Generalleutnant a.D . Walter Schwabedissen , The Russian












very tew or tnese were used by the military. Aircraft
instruments, such as radio direction- finding equipment,
were crude and obsolete and even the influx of superior
.American equipment failed to improve the situation because
of a critical shortage of personnel able to operate the
equipment. Harold Faber in Luftwaffe, a History offers a
truly unique, descriptive account of Soviet airfield opera-
tions before the German attack.
"Control towers were unheard of in Soviet ground
organizations and radio and electrical apparatus were
usually nonexistent. V.'hen units took off it was remi-
niscent of the old flying squadrons of World War I,
which operated from primitive fields and communicated
by a wave of the hand or a tip of the wings. Even
normal field telephone equipment was absent from most
Soviet airfields." 40
Soviet communications equipment of 1941 was technically
inferior to German and American equipment of that time,
Lt.Col. Kamill Usfensky, an intelligence officer in the Red
Army on the Eastern Front, considered the American field
telephones provided the Soviets through the Lend-Lease
Program as, in his words, "twice as good" as Russian phones
then in use. The German communications equipment encoun-
tered by the Soviets during the course of Operation Barba-
rossa was so superior to similar Russian equipment in use,








telephones whenever they were available. 41 The Soviets
were habitually short of radio sets, operators, and repair-
men. In tact on 22 June 1941 the 3rd Army under Lieutenant-
General Kuznetsov, holding the right flank of the Western
Military District at its junction with the Baltic Military-
District, had no radios in service to higher headquarters
during the German attack.
Varying degrees of sophistication existed in the cryp-
tography employed by the Soviet forces in Operation
Barbarossa. Only at strategic levels could the well-trained
radio operators handle complicated ciphers with assist-
ance from cryptographic specialists while the tactical units
were restricted to elementary ciphers and simple call signs
4 4.due to the limited training of the communications operators.
German Army Group codebreakers were unable to crack the high
level codes employed between Stavka and the Theater Commands
but codes used below corps level, often the Caesar's Codes
actually developed during the time of Caesar, proved rela-
45tively easy for the Germans to decipher. In addition to





General der Nachrichtentruppen Albert Praun, German
Radio Intelligence (Unpublished Foreign Military Studies
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The Soviet 5-AK-1M transmitter receiver was a relatively
compact, vehicular mounted radio used by the Red Army
during Operation Barbarossa. The 5-AK-1M transmitter-
receiver weighed approximately 286 pounds and required
over 36 feet of antenna to operate..
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word-substitution codewords in their tactical transmis-
sions. To facilitate their use, the codewords were
usually written around the border of the unit operations
map, which resulted in the capture of the codewords when-
ever a map was captured during Operation Barbarossa. There
can be no provisions for the compromise of such an elemen-
tary system of codewords as employed by the Soviets and the
use of this primitive codeword system caused a false sense
of security in the communication means on which the code-
words are employed.
The Soviet Command and Control (C ) System, which con-
ceptually can be considered a subset of the overall Soviet
Command, Control, and Communication System, was a system
unique to the Soviets, influenced heavily by the same pre-
conceived notion of warfare in the west discussed earlier,
as well as the people the system served and controlled.
2The C system was effective under peacetime conditions but
largely untested under the combat conditions for which it
was supposedly designed. Apparently little thought, if
any, had been given to the type of defensive situations
which developed during Operation Barbarossa, In time of
2
war it is often difficult to separate the national C
46 See Generaloberst Hellmuth Reinhardt, Small Unit
Tactics (Unpublished Foreign Military Studies Typescript





system from the military C system, and actions taken by
the Soviet Union during Operation Barbarossa effectively
merged these two C" systems so that a discussion of the
Soviet C in general must include both systems.
National strategic leadership was undefined in the Soviet
Union on 22 June 1941, a detail supported by the fact that
there was no supreme command, supreme command headquarters
47facility, nor clearly discernable supreme commander. As
Marshal of the Soviet Union, V,D, Sokolovskii recounts:
"...We had not worked out the problems of strategic
leadership of the Armed Forces by the beginning of the
war. As a result, leadership in the command of the
armed forces was quite inadequate during the initial
period of the war. "48
As Commissiar of Defense Marshal Timonshenko was, in fact,
the supreme commander but by sheer authority and intimida-
tion Stalin, who, as previously indicated, was personally
49
making all of the important military decisions, was in
actuality the supreme commander. There was no adequate
command facility, uniquely dedicated or designated, from
which the supreme commander could effectively exercise
command and control. Accounts of the Defense Ministry
during the initial hours of Operation Barbarossa imparted
to the author the distinct impression that Marshal
4/ See Erickson, Stalingrad, p. 114
48 Sokolovskii, Soviet Military Strategy, p. 252.
49 The Great Patriotic War, p. 11.
50 Erickson, Stalingrad , p. 126.
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Timoshenko, and his assistant General Ihukov, responded to
the German attack from the desks in their offices, without
the benefit of a facility befitting the true gravity of the
situation. The absence of an established set of proce-
dures to designate and use the command facilities available
at either the Moscow Military District or the Air Defence
Command Headquarters in Moscow is further testimony of the
7
inadequacy of Soviet Strategic C" on 22 June 1941,
The command structure was quickly modified on 23 June
1941 when the Central Committee of the Communist Party
formed the Headquarters of the Supreme Command (Stavka)
under the Defense Commissar, Marshal Timoshenko, One week
later, on 50 June, the Central Committee, Supreme Soviet,
and Soviet of the People's Commissars of the USSR created
the State Defense Commit te (GKO) with complete state and
5?
military power. " The GKO members were soon sitting as part
of the Stavka and by 10 July the State Defense Committee had
created three high commands (or theater level commands) to
assist the Stavka exercise direct command of the troops.
The high commands functioned in the field directly under the
Stavka in Moscow by coordinating several fronts for the ac-
complishment of general strategic missions in specific
See Erickson, Stalingrad
, pp. 101-135 for an exception
ally detailed account of the initial hours of Operation
Barbarossa.
i2 Sokolovskii, Soviet Military Strategy, pp. 487-488,
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geographical areas. As Marshal Sokolovskii points out,
"This decision of the State Defense Committe changed
the Stavka of the High Command into the Stavka of the
Supreme High Command under the direction of the Chair-
man of the State Committee of Defense ... and in August
it was placed under the direction of the Supreme Com-




During the entire Great Patriotic War, the Stavka
was the highest agency of strategic command for the
Armed Forces. It was a collegial agency. All the most
important decisions were made after the Stavka discus-
sed them with the front commands, the commanders-in-
chief of the branches of the Armed Forces, the service -.
commanders, as well as with other individuals concerned,"
Following the reorganizations just described, the Stavka was
composed of select members of the Politburo, the Chief of
the General Headquarters, and individual higher command per-
sonnel. 5:) By August 1941, Joseph Stalin's consolidation of
power was complete and he had refined centralization to a
new degree as Chairman of the State Defense Committee,
Defense Commissar (replacing Timoshenko who had been as-
signed to a theater command) , and Supreme Commander.
Changes were also made in the organization of the mili-
tary as Operation Barbarossa progressed. As stated previ-
ously, portions of the military organization were in the








56 Erickson, Stalingrad, p. 180
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Army up to date with the more modern concepts of warfare
employed by the Germans. The incomplete reorganization of
Soviet armor forces resulted in large, unwieldy formations,
5 7impossible to control. The corps level, an integral part
of the chain of command on 22 June, was eliminated by 10
July because initial combat losses aggrevated the already
existing shortage of trained officers. Figure III illustra-
tes the chain of command on 22 June 1941 and Figures III and
IV together highlight the changes that occurred during the
first seven weeks of Operation Barbarossa in the national
and military command structures. The military districts
indicated in Figure III were peacetime administrative organi-
zations for the mobilization of reserves which transitioned
into fronts, essentially army groups, in time of war. The
military districts along the western frontier on the eve of
the German attack are provided in Figure V, As mentioned
earlier, three high commands (theaters) were formed on 10
July to facilitate command of the troops by the Stavka and
were designated essentially by their area of responsibility
5 8
as the Northwest, West and Southwest Commands,
The Soviet system of command was clumsy and inflexible
59
during the early days of Operation Barbarossa when
Interview, von Luttichau.
58 Sokolovskii, Soviet Military Strategy , p. 489.
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1 Formed 50 June 1941 with complete state and military
powers to provide the leadership organ by which
national decisions could be made and coordinated.
Headquarters of the Supreme Command (Stavka) formed
23 June 1941 under the Defense Commissar, placed
under GKO on 10 July. The Stavka provided the
General Headquarters lacking on 22 June with which
Moscow could direct the military.
Formed 10 July 1941 to facilitate control of the
fighting units by Stavka.
Military Districts transformed into Fronts during
the first ten days of Operation Barbarossa.










































On 10 August Joseph Stalin as Supreme Commander
approved a GKO recommendation which changed the
Stavka from simply the General Headquarters into




Rus so -German Frontier Military Districts
Leningrad Military District: 14th, T th, 25d Soviet Armies
sector: from the Barents Sea to the Gulf of Finland
Baltic (Special) Military District: 8th, 11th Soviet Armies
sector: 500 kilometers of frontier with East Prussia
5tern (Special) Military District: 3rd, 10th, 4th Soviet
Armies
sector: 4"0 kilometers of frontier, Belorussia
Kiev (Special) Military District: 5th, 6th, 26th, 12th
Soviet Armies
sector: 865 kilometers of frontier, Ukraine (from Vlodava
to Lipkany)
Odessa Military District: 9th Soviet Army (administrative
only)
sector: from Lipkang to Odessa (defense of the Crimea
assigned to independent rifle corps)
Note: According to Erickson, Stalingrad
,
p. 71
the Special Military Districts were operational
groupings capable of operations for a limited time
without mobilization of additional reserves unlike
the other Military Districts which were largely
administrative organizations to facilitate reserve
mobilization.
Information for this figure was derived from
Erickson, Stalingrad, pp. 68-69,
48

unexpected situations precluded quick response. Geographi-
cal restraints imposed by the great distances between
strategic locations and physical constraints of the Russian
transportation system limited response options by making
rapid redeployment and large-scale movement improbable.
The Soviet military and political leadership at the strate-
gic level lacked a realistic view of the actual situation
since it had underestimated the German potential while over-
estimating the Soviet potential. The influences just
cited combined to interfere with innovative, original re-
sponses to German offensive maneuvers and caused the selec-
tion of preconceived responses or responses patterned in
strict accord with established doctrine. At the tactical
level, officers and N'CO's were reluctant to exercise initia-
6 2tive partly because they feared punishment for failures
while in situations when initiative was displayed the
highly centralized Soviet command structure facilitated
higher authority review and reversal of actions perceived
as inappropriate. The ordinary soldier simply followed the
example set by his superiors and displayed a decided lack
of initiative as well. Many commanders who had been quickly




61 Sokolovskii , Soviet Military Strategy , p,249.
62 Reinhardt, Small Unit Tactics
,
Appendix I, p. 11.
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for their positions and for some of these commanders war,
such as it was in the first days of Operation Barbarossa,
was beyond their comprehension. The lower command eche-
lons in the Red Army characteristically suffered from poor
leadership since the best leaders had risen to higher com-
mands. The Soviet Air Force command appeared to German
commanders as awkward, old-fashioned, stereo-typed, and at
times hampered by political party control. Although the
communist party activities in the army may have exerted
detrimental influences similar to those experienced in the
air force, in at least one respect the party strengthened
military command by adding robustness to the command struc-
ture, since the political officer was always available to
replace the commander should he be removed unexpectedly by
a u * 67enemy action during combat.
Orders issued by the Soviets during the Great Patriotic
f\ ft
War were generally clear and, at least on the tactical
level, simple. Due to the general confusion pervading the







66 Schwabedissen, The Russian Air Force, p. 12.
67 Interview, von Luttichau and Finke,
ft ft
Interview, von Luttichau.
69 Reinhardt, Small Unit Tactics , Appendix I, p,10.
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Soviet Union during the initial weeks of Operation
7 nBarbarossa, orders issued from Moscow were very confusing
and unrealistic until the Soviets gained an understanding
71
of the true state of affairs. As Supreme Commander, Joseph
Stalin issued the most important orders to his front com-
manders by summoning them to the Stavka or sending Stavka
representatives to the fronts. Whether Stalin personally
issued the orders himself or simply caused them to be issued
in his presence is unclear but the important point is that
critical strategic orders were indeed issued in person, and
not by other means such as couriers or electronic transmis-
72
sions. Reports from the fronts to Moscow were likewise
73presented in person' and during the first few days of the
war, before the leaders in Moscow clearly understood the
Soviet position, the Stavka sent representatives to the
fronts to determine the true situation and to assist the
front commanders respond to the enemy advances.
Centralization was a key element in the Soviet Command
and Control System and was a positive force in mobilizing
the country and the military once the Soviets recovered
from the initial devastating setbacks of Operation









2centralized Soviet C System adversely affected the Soviet
ability to respond quickly and effectively. 74 As perhaps
the most dire example of the detrimental influences of the
highly centralized Soviet C System consider that after the
first two days of war, Stalin became inaccessable when he
'locked himself in his quarters' for several days (at least
three) so that at precisely the time the Soviet Union re-
quired its most inspired leadership, when the very existence
of the Soviet Union was most seriously challenged, the key
2figure in the Soviet C System was not available. During
the first few days of the attack the highly centralized
command system also required commanders in the field to
await orders from Moscow which arrived late, if at all, and
76
were quite unrealistic. Field commanders, in retrospect,
were in a better position to make their own decisions if
for no other reason than the precious time that could be
saved by eliminating additional communications channels.
As the war progressed, the Stavka by-passed the fronts when-
ever the situation required and communicated directly with
the various armies, although the fronts were always in-
77





76 See Nekrich, 2 2 June 1941
,
p. 220 for an account of
a telephone conversation on 11 June between Marshal
Timoshenko, Defense Commissar, and General Boldin, Deputy
Commander of the Western Special Military District,
77 Sokolovskii, Soviet Military Strategy , p. 493,
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Considering that each front had evolved from a military
district which had been basically an administrative grouping
of armies, it is not surprising that the front was occasion-
ally by-passed to achieve operational expediency.
The Soviet leadership had prepared mobilization and
defense plans but they were either incomplete or based on
the erroneous concept of war in the west previously discus-
sed. Plans for the economic mobilization of the war indus
-
7 8
tries' were ineffective and incomplete and crises
management techniques were required to supplement them. 79
The 1941 defense plan for the west was predicated on the
ability of the border units and frontier military districts
to provide sufficient time for the mobilization of the main
o n
forces in the event of surprise attack. The adequacy of
the 1941 defense plan certainly appears questionable now,
but what was equally important as the adequacy of any
defense plan in 1941 was the level of readiness of those
units designated to implement that plan. Marshal of the
Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovskiy , a corps commander in the
18th Army during Operation Barbarossa has written that,
"Requests from some district troop commanders for
authority to bring their troops to combat readiness and
move them closer to the frontier were personally turned
down by J.V. Stalin. The troops continued to be trained
in peacetime fashion: the artillery of infantry divisions
was in artillery camps and ranges, antiaircraft weapons






80 Nekrizh, 2 2 June 1941, p. 68.
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on antiaircraft ranges, and sapper units in engineer
camps, and the 'naked' infantry regiments of divisions
were located separately in their camps,
'
:81
The point is that despite massive outlays of men and equip-
ment along the frontier, readiness levels required in the
1941 defense plan were not sufficient to optimize the proba-
bility of success of that plan against a surprise attack.
The Soviet Union was continually improving its border de-
fenses and individual commanders were, on their own initia-
tive, taking measures to improve their unit readiness but
when these individual actions were discovered in Moscow they
frequently were countermanded. For example, Colonel-General
Kuznetsov, Commander of the Baltic Special Military District,
on his own initiative instituted a partial blackout of the
naval bases and airfields in his district to reduce his
vulnerability to possible enemy intelligence activity.
Colonel-General Voronov, Commander of the Anti-Air Defense
Command (PVO) , learned of this precaution and recommended it
to the General Staff for adoption elsewhere, but, instead,
82
Moscow specifically countermanded Kuznetsov's order.
The facilities from which, and with which, Red Army
Commanders exercised C J in the field were austere as the
following account of an army headquarters on 22 June 1941
clearly indicates. 10th Army Headquarters, which at 2100
on the 22nd was located six miles southwest of Bialystok,
81 See Xekrich, 22 June 1941 , p. 198
82 See Erickson, Stalingrad , p. 83,
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consisted of only two tents, wooden tables and stools, a
telephone and a radio truck. 8 *5 This headquarters was appa-
rently the 10th Army's advance command post (CP) which at
the army level consisted of from ten to fifteen men and
included the following: the node of communications; crypto-
graphic, operations, and intelligence personnel
; political
and state security personnel, liaison officers; and the
commander. Further back from the forward edge of the battle
area (FEBA) was the first echelon of the CP, comprising the
main staff effort under the chief of staff. Still further
behind the FEBA was the rear element of the CP which handled
84logistical matters. Command posts in cities and villages
were often located in school buildings since they were
generally the newest brick facilities with sufficient in-
terior space to accommodate a staff operation. Factories
and administration buildings on collective farms were also
suitable locations for CP's, in the absence of schools, but
private dwellings were unsatisfactory due to the prevalent
8 5problem of pest infestation in Russian homes.
Each headquarters, down to and including company level
on the border, was issued sealed letters containing special










same sealed letters to which John Erickson refers when he
recounts the opening of "Red Packets', containing mobili-
zation plans and cover plans, between 0430 and 0500 on the
o n
22nd. These letters, or packets, ostensibly contained
orders to be opened by the commander under very specific
circumstances, although it is unclear from all accounts
whether the letters were to be opened only upon direction
of higher authority or upon the initiative of the indivi-
dual commander.
Soviet maps used during Operation Barbarossa were ade-
quate for intended purposes but were quite primitive by
8 8
comparison with German maps of the same time. There was
apparently no system which allowed continuous use of maps
by the Soviets, except for those portions of the map pre-
viously unused, since marks placed on the maps by the users
were indelible. Obvious efforts to remove marks from sever
al maps examined had resulted in the removal of printed
features as well and had rendered that portion of the map
unserviceable. Unlike their German opponents, the Soviets
had no mobile map production facilities to service the




88 The author examined several Russian maps captured by
the Germans and compared them to German maps of the same




probably Moscow, which had to be delivered to the various
un i t s .
Intelligence information was a critical input to the
Soviet system of Command and Control during Operation
Barbarossa and the surprise nature of that operation made
the early warning phase of the intelligence function even
more important than it had been previously. The Soviet
Union had an excellent network of spies in foreign countries,
especially Germany and Japan , relaying very accurate, timely
information to Moscow. Although the United States and Great
Britain both warned the Soviets of German intentions regard-
ing Operation Barbarossa the Soviet leaders attached low
esteem to these warnings since the Soviets considered these
warnings as efforts to undermine the relationship estab-
lished by the Soviet Union and Germany through such agree-
ments as the 1959 Nonaggression Pact. German soldiers
defecting to the Soviet Union only hours before the attack
89
relayed very accurate details of the impending attack
but the Soviet leadership, in particular Stalin, totally
discounted the possibility of a surprise attack of the
dimensions of Operation Barbarossa and considered such
reports as attempts by the Germans to provoke Soviet action.
See Erickson, Stalingrad , p. 105. One deserter,
Alfred Liskow, crossing the lines at 2100 on 21 June 1941,
reportedly stated the attack would commence at 0400 and
that German guns were in firing positions. In response to
a report from a deserter Stalin, possible referring to
Liskow, ordered him to be shot for his disinformation.
57

The individuals who provided intelligence information to
Stalin, such as the Military Intelligence (GRU) Chief
Marshal Golikov, while not intentionally misinforming
Stalin, evidently were well aware of Stalin's frame of mind
before their meetings and presented intelligence in the
manner least irritating to their leader. Presentation of
intelligence in such a fashion to Stalin, who shared the
Soviet preconceived notion of the type of war which might
develop with Germany, certainly detracted from the impact
of that intelligence.
Several aspects of the Soviet intelligence system ex-
isting on 22 June were inadequate and deserve special men-
3tion to provide a better general appreciation of Soviet C
capabilities and limitations during Operation Barbarossa.
Although the Soviet Air Force possessed operational recon-
naissance aircraft very few, if any, were located along the
frontier. Instead, fighter and attack planes designed for
other specialized missions were employed in a reconnaissance
role. When air reconnaissance did produce valuable intelli-
gence, the Soviet Air Force system of processing the infor-
mation and inaugurating a response was so poor that usually
91little effect was derived from air reconnaissance. The
air raid warning system was so poorly organized, even by
Soviet standards, that fighter planes launched in response
90 Interview, Nekrich.
91 Faber, Luftwaffe, pp.228 and 251
58

to warnings from the system usually arrived too late to
provide adequate overhead cover for the Soviet forces.
The air defense forces (PVO) control system performed un-
satisfatorily and only a force reorganization and complete
new air defense system could provide proper air defense in
931941. Representative of Soviet intelligence information
during Operation Barbarossa is the complaint of General
Tikhamirov, chief of the operations section of the North
-
West Front, that the intelligence distributed to his front
from Moscow in early July regarding the German forces
assaulting his area of responsibility was too general and
inaccurate to be of value.
Immediately preceding and during the initial attack of
Operation Barbarossa, the Soviet border provided a particu-
larly important early warning capability. The 1939 Non-
aggression Pact had apparently diminished the urgency for a
quick, thorough completion of the facilities along the new
Soviet-German border and those facilities were incomplete
at the time of the German attack. The new Soviet border,
resulting from the division of Poland, extended for almost
1200 miles from the Baltic Sea at the border of East Prussia
and Lithuania, through Poland, along the eastern borders of
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria to the Black
Sea. Approximately 700 of these 1200 miles bordered German
92The Great Patriotic War , p. 50.
93Sokolovskii, Soviet Military Strategy, p. 265
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occupied territory. The border itself and the border units
in the forward portion of the frontier region were the re-
sponsibility of the Interior Commissariat. No less than
ten armies of the Defense Commissariat were located in the
frontier military districts, listed in Figure V, and added
depth to the border defense by positioning units behind the
border up to 300, and in some cases 600, kilometers. These
forces were not positioned in accordance with any system-
94
atic plan of defense since there was no means of rapid
deployment available. Supply points were close to the
border itself and frequently located a considerable distance
95from the units and equipment they served. Although the
Red Army was indeed very large and conducting active train-
ing in the border military districts during June 1941, it
was none- the-less in a peacetime posture with artillery
pieces located separately from the stored ammunition and
tank units located separately from their ammunition and fuel
The road network to support the border, so critical to the
Soviet plan to reinforce the border, was incomplete on 22
June 1941. 96
The sophisticated electronic sensors of today are quite
different from the elemental sensors employed on the Soviet
94Basil Collier, The Second World War
;
A Military
History (New York, 1967)
,
p. 201.




borders in 1941. There was no radar available on the
border: instead, elementary sensors such as police dogs and
9 7humans were used. Patrolling was employed on the Soviet
side of the border but apparently very little, if any,
patrol activity crossed the border, although local civilian
inhabitants visiting on the German side were undoubtedly
questioned concerning their observations of German forces
98
and activity. The border itself was a barrier consisting
of a barbed wire apron with a variety of primitive alarm
signals. Behind the initial apron of wire was a strip of
cleared, raked earth probably less than fifty yards in
width to highlight footprints. Listening posts were lo-
cated at regular intervals and wooden three-man guard
towers about twenty-five yards high were erected approxima-
tely every 500 yards with telephonic and visual communica-




99Apparently the width of this strip varied with the
location of the border. For an excellent description of
the border, along the Bug River in Poland, facing Army
Group Center see Gene ral leutnant Curt Cano , German Prepara -
tions for the Attack on Russia (Unpublished Foreign Mill -
tary Studies Typescript *D-247 Historical Division USEUCOM
,
1947) , See Generalleutnant Hans Bergen, Part Played by the
187th Infantry Regiment m the 87th Infantry Division Attack
at the Beginning ol the Russian Campaign on 22 June 1941
Unpublished Foreign Military Studies Typescript #D-074
Historical Division USEUCOM
,
1947)~ for an account of the
border in East Prussia.






reconnoitered between the tov;ers. 101 Excellent field
fortifications extended six to eight kilometers beyond the
10 7barrier with the defensive facilities manned by squads or
companies. Some new bunkers and artillery positions in
this belt of defensive positions were still under construc-
tion and possibly unmanned during June 1941. Behind the
border was a security belt of approximately twenty miles
from which inhabitants of certain areas were removed while
in other areas they were allowed to remain but forbidden to
shelter strangers.
As the battle raged eastward, the border was no longer
a significant intelligence source and the military relied
on such intelligence gathering means as ground patrolling,
air reconnaissance, and radio direction finding. The
military probably also received information from less con-
ventional sources such as civilian refugees and military
stragglers fleeing from behind enemy lines. There are
accounts of refugees actually seeking German units,








104Bergen, 187th Infantry Regiment
,
p. 6.
Leverkeuhn, German Military Intelligenc e, p. 156.
General der Machrichtentruppen Albert Praun, Signal
Communications in the East (Unpublished Foreign Military































































ostensibly for food, but in reality to gather intelli-
gence. The government in Moscow, while receiving intel-
ligence from the military, continued to receive information
from other nations and agents in other countries, and un-
doubtedly received valuable information from local civilian
officials who suddenly found themselves behind the advancing
German Armies.
The Soviet Transportation System in 1941, consisting
essentially of the railroad and road network, was adequate
for the needs of the Soviet Union while a sparsely settled,
industrially developing nation. It was quite inadequate to
10 8
support large, modern military forces and was considered
109the weakest factor in the Soviet military potential.
The Soviet Union was traversed in literally all directions
by innumerable waterways of varying dimensions but military
operations during Operation Barbarossa were not significant-
ly affected by any water transportation system except that
an impressive number of bridges was necessitated to main-
tain transportation continuity across the many rivers and
streams. Since the German forces were very dependent on
extremely quick, mobile forces and the Soviets had to rapid-





108Abberger, Roads and Railroads in Russia , p. 2,
109 Schwabedissen, The Russian Air Force, p. 50.
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bridges quickly assumed paramount importance as a most
critical element in the transportation system to ensure the
accomplishment of required military movements via road and
rail in the short periods of time dictated. Appendix B
is an in-depth analysis of the Soviet Transportation System
in 1941 by Generalleutnant Max Boric, a transportation expert
with the German Army, and is the best account available of
the Soviet Transportation System in relation to Operation
Barbarossa.
Although the railroad was the most reliable transporta-
tion system in the Soviet Union and provided the most prac-
tical means of accomplishing the massive, relatively rapid,
strategic force maneuvers required of the Soviets in response
to the German attack, the Soviet railroad was not as extensi-
vely developed as railroads in other European countries. In
1958, the latest year prior to 1941 for which statistics
have been discovered, the Soviet Union as a whole had only
.65 miles of rail per 100 square miles with 1.8 miles per
100 square miles in European Russia, compared to the German
railroad average of 20 miles per 100 square miles. There
were only 3.3 miles of track per 10,000 inhabitants in
Russia, where the railroad was concentrated most heavily
around the industrial areas of the Donets Basin, Moscow, and
Leningrad, but Germany boasted 5.8 miles of track per 10,000
inhabitants. Signalling and safety devices were primitive
compared with railroads in other countries and Russian track
beds were constructed of sand and gravel instead of
65

crush-rock ballast used elsewhere due to a scarcity of rock.
The standard railroad guage in Europe was four feet, eight
and one-half inches but the Russian railroad guage was five
feet which allowed more loading space per car. There were
no double-track railroad bridges in Russia; instead single-
track spans separated by 50 to 100 yards were constructed.
Some of these bridges were temporary spans constructed during
World War I which would have been considered quite unsafe
anywhere but in Russia.
The Soviet railroad assumes even greater importance when
compared to the shallow system of roads in Russia in 1941,
The road network satisfied the relatively weak demands of
peactime traffic but failed to meet the requirements of
modern warfare. The Red Army did use motor vehicles for
transportation but much of its transport requirements were
satisfied by horse-drawn means. Paved roads were consider-
ably different from what is common in America today. Con-
crete was not used to construct roads although cobblestone
and asphalt-like materials were used but roads were paved
only in sections, if at all. Except in urban areas, paved
roads were so rare as to be specifically mentioned in
writings about Operation Barbarossa and only four all-
weather, hard-surfaced roads have been identified in western
General leutnant Max Bork, Comments on Russian Rail -
roads and Highway s [Unpublished Foreign Military Studies
-
Typescript ^T-7 Historical Division UShUCOM , 19biJ , pp.Z-7
1:L1Abberger, Roads and Railroads in Russia , p,2,
66

Russia during Barbarossa. The main roads were broad, hard-
rolled and quite satisfactory, although dusty in dry weather
They became absolutely bottom-less after rain and snow when
vehicles would widen the roads by driving around untraffic-
ll 7
able areas. In many German corps, and sometimes entire
army, areas, there was not a single hard-surfaced road. 113
In the entire Army Group North area, for example, there
were only two all-weather roads capable of sustaining heavy
traffic while the other roads were weather dependent. 114
In the opinion of Generalleutnant Bork, there was only one
road in European Russia constructed in accordance with
western European standards which received proper, consis-
tent maintenance-
-the Minsk-Moscow Highway, 115
Soviet Command, Control, and Communications, in general,
was adequate for the primitive, peacetime requirements of
the Soviet Union in 1941 before the German attack. The C 3
System was designed for the more offensive, less defensive,
military operations envisioned by the Soviets, the type of
operations which German initiative precluded. In other
112 Sintzenich, 132d Infantry Division
,
p. 2,
Abberger, Roads and Railroads in Russia
,
p. 3.
114 Generalmaj or Burkhart Mueller-Hillebrand, German
Army Group Operations on the Eastern Front 1941-43" (Unpub -
ished Foreign Military Studies Typescript #P-114a Historical
Division USEUCOM
, 1954), p. 9.





















































































words the Soviet C System, like the Russian transportation
system, was not constructed to cope with the harsh realities
produced by the modern, mobile, very aggressive German
Wehrmacht executing Operation 3arbarossa.
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III. GERMAN PLANNING FOR OPERATION BARBAROSSA
On 21 July 1940 Adolf Hitler tasked the Commander in
Chief of the Army, General feldmar shall Walter von
Brauchitsch, in face tc face conversation, with the submis-
sion of plans for a campaign against the Soviet Union. One
week later General der Artillerie Erich Marcks began develop-
ing such a plan, the essence of which was to neutralize the
Soviet Air Force and destroy the Red Army employing surprise
and mobility. General feldmar shall Friedrich Paulus, as
the new Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, continued
to develop Marck's plan and, following validation of that
plan in November and December 1940 by General Staff Exercises
and Command Post Exercises with the weight and complexity of
war games, Hitler issued his famous Directive Number 21 on
18 December 1940 for Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of
117the Soviet Union.
The German objective in Russia was to acquire living
space in the east by erecting a barrier against Asiatic
Russia generally along the Volga River, to Archangel, and to
prevent Soviet airstrikes against Germany. Operation
116 The German Campaign in Russia: Planning and
Operations (1940-1942 ) (Washington, 1955), pp. 1-25.
117
A copy of Directive Number 21 is generally available
in volumes on the Russo-German War. See Guderian,.
Panzer Leader
,
p. 513 or Hugh Trevor-Roper, ed. , Hitler's War
Directive 1939-1945 (London, 1964), p. 49.
71

Barbarossa was designed to achieve this objective by des-
troying the bulk of the Soviet Army in Western Russia with
daring operations led by deeply penetrating armored spear-
heads. An Army High Command (OXH) Directive dated 31
January 1941 specified that the Army would prevent the with-
drawal of Soviet forces attempting to escape destruction,
and to achieve this goal, the Army conceived of great
encirclements to be executed by rapid, deeply-penetrating
armored spearheads. The spearheads would prevent Soviet
escape and facilitate the destruction, or capture, of the
maximum number of Soviet soldiers by the accompanying foot-
marching German infantry divisions. The German encirclements
were designed to achieve surprise and quick execution to
preclude any organized Soviet response and the battlefield
within the encirclements was to be isolated by both air and
ground units to further preclude any swift, coordinated
counter-action. Planning was coordinated with German Customs
Officials to allow army commanders to reconnoiter the border
in conjunction with routine border security investigations
119
without alarming Soviet border guards. Further planning
with Customs Officials permitted the relief in place of
border units by regular army units before the attack to
110
Barry Leach, German Strategy Against Russia (Oxford
1973) App.III A copy of OKK Directive dated 31 January 1941
is provided in Appendix C.
119 Generaloberst Erhard Raus , Deceptions and Cover Plans
( Unpublished Foreign Military Studies Typescript #P-044~b
Historical Division USEUCOM, 1951), pp. 1-9.
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enhance the army's ability to achieve surprise. Border
crossing points were arranged according to the designated
121
military objectives and the road system across the border
while the final movements to attack positions were planned
for execution during the hours of darkness.
The artillery assets of the German Army were tasked to
support the ground scheme of maneuver by destroying fortifi-
cations, communications facilities, command posts, and
obscuring enemy observation. The German Army exercised
great care in the selection of artillery targets and close
coordination between infantry and artillery units was re-
quired due to scant supplies of artillery ammunition.
The following examples of artillery preparation fires by
units of Army Group Center demonstrate that some of the
initial artillery fires of the Army Group were designed to
proliferate the normal confusion incident to battle. The
operations order of the 17th Panzer Division, stationed
along the Bug River in Poland as an element of XLVII Panzer
Corps of Panzer Group 2 (Guderian) , required a 15 minute
artillery and rocket preparation to cripple enemy defenses
and eliminate enemy observation while establishing a smoke
12
Mueller Hillebrand, Army Group Operations
,
p. 24.




screen to cover the crossing of the Bug River. Although
the Commander of the 18"th Infantry Regiment (87th Infantry
Division) preferred total surprise, the 9th Army, poised
along the Pisa River in East Prussia, ordered a ten minute
preparation along the entire Army front, which included the
87th Infantry Division zone, to suppress potential enemy
strong points, bunkers, command posts, and observation posts
Simultaneously, anti-tank guns were ordered to eliminate
three Soviet guard towers in the 187th Infantry Regiment's
zone of action. The 9th Army had determined the disruption
of the enemy's C was of more value than the few minutes of
surprise sacrificed by firing artillery preparatory fires.
In Directive Number 21, Hitler assigned the Luftwaffe
the mission to paralyze the reaction and eliminate the ef-
fectiveness of the Soviet Air Force and to support the main
army operations. The Air Field Manual provided guidance to
the German Air Force for conducting air operations and was
employed as a fundamental planning document by the Luftwaffe
123
when planning for Operation Barbarossa. " German air opera-
tions were designed to be tactical in nature and to disrupt
Soviet communications after eliminating the Russian Air
124Force. The Luftwaffe planned to isolate encircled enemy
12 2
"See Cano, German Preparations for a detailed account
of the 17th Panzer Divisions's activities on 22 June 1941,
123Richard Suchenwirth, Historical Turning Points in the




124 Generalleutnant Hermann Plocher, The German Air Force
Versus Russia, 1941 (New York, 1965), p78~!
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forces by striking transportation facilities to cut off the
encircled units from outside assistance and to preclude
coordinated retaliation between encircled and relief forces
by severing C J links.
Extensive effort produced detailed targeting information
which the Luftwaffe divided into several categories, such as
military objectives, industrial objectives, transportation
12 5facilities, and communications facilities. " Air reconnais-
sance assisting the targeting effort began during the winter
of 1940-1941 after Hitler personally ordered such activity
126in October, 1940. ** The General Staff prepared comprehen-
sive target dossiers from the various target categories and
these dossiers were so meticulously organized as to include
large and small scale maps, air photos, and even relief maps
12"7
when required. Targets were additionally classified as
those which would appear only after war began and those
present before hostilities. By doctrine, air planning at-
tached higher priority to those targets existing before the
The Air Manual specifically lists signal communica-
tions centers among these targets appropriate for destruc-
tion by bombing. See General der Fleiger a.D . Paul
Deichman, The System Target Selection Applied by the German
Air Force (Unpublished Typescript USAF Historical Study #1~8~6
,
1956) .
1 6 General leutnant a.D . Andreas Nielsen, The Collection
and Evaluation of Intelligence for the German Air Force











attack and to the planning and intelligence gathering
activities conducted during peacetime.
The staff planning to support the ground operations of
Army Group North was indicative of the Luftwaffe effort to
prepare for Barbarossa and produced a plan designed to:
1) Attack all Soviet airfields within range and oper-
ate against Soviet aircraft in the air and on the ground
to prevent any counter-air activity against army
operations
;
2) Provide fighter protection for the advancing ground
forces against possible enemy air attack,
3) Interdict Soviet highways and rail traffic,
4) Attack the Soviet Baltic Fleet and merchant shipping,
5) Directly and indirectly support ground forces with
bombers, and
129
6) Attack the Soviet air armament industry.
Army Group Center, to the south, meanwhile, prepared a list
of special targets, including signal centers and communica-
tion posts in eleven different cities, for the Second Air
Fleet to attack on June 22.
An extensive deception plan was devised to convince the





Plocher, The German Air Force , p. 142.
130 See Erickson, Stalingrad
,
p. 98 for a list of the
towns containing these communications facilities.
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were still riveted on Great Britain during the winter of
1941 and to disguise troop reassignments required in
preparation for Operation Barbarossa. German units rede-
ployed eastward following the French and Balkan campaigns
reportedly to alleviate German food distribution problems
and to facilitate the deactivation of units already along
the border. Once deployed, units actually designated to
attack the Soviet Union continued to train for the amphibi-
ous invasion of England. The exact number of units along
the border was camouflaged by combining understrength units
but maintaining the headquarters of the deactivated forces
to simulate normal communications among non-existent
commands
.
Final plans for the invasion of the Soviet Union inclu-
ded the employment of commando units and nationalist agents
to penetrate Soviet defenses and support the army scheme of
maneuver. These special organizations disrupted communica-
tions, spread alarm and confusion, and seized key trans-
portation facilities vital to the German advance. For years
preceding Operation Barbarossa, the Germans had recruited
members of various ethnic groups adjacent to and within the
Soviet Union, and trained them as agents and commandos. The
agents formed several nationalists minority organizations









to be used behind enemy lines and the commandos were even-
tually formed into the famed Brandenburg Lehr Regiment, an
army unit, for Operation Barbarossa. °°
These organizations specialized in intelligence acti-
vities, sabotage, diversion, and the seizure of key mili-
tary objectives. During May 1941, Abwehr II [German opera-
tional intelligence) formulated sabotage assignments for
these groups against Soviet signals networks and frontier
facilities, assignments to be executed only upon special
orders of the High Command. During the early days of
June, the Army High Command finalized its own plans for the
employment of agents and commandos in sabotage, diversion,
and subversion and selected specific bridges, post offices,
rail lines, railroad stations, and signal centers for de-
struction or capture. J Whenever agents or Brandenburg
units operated in the military zone of action, they were
controlled by the army or army group in whose zone they
operated. Abwehr II was again busy in June planning acti-
vities similar to those already conceived of by OKH, desig-
nating forty-five objectives for special attack by the
Brandenburgers and national minorities. The Brandenburgers
,
For a more detailed treatment of the use of ethnic
minorities in Operation Barbarossa by the Abwehr , see
Leverkeuhn, German Military Intelligence .










who usually dressed as Soviet soldiers to deceive the enemy,
were concerned with those targets within 15 kilometers of
the border to paralyze the enemy's defense and destroy the
enemy's will to fight. J Agents, usually posing as indi-
ginous civilians, operated against deeper targets up to
200 kilometers beyond the border and infiltrated the Soviet
border for several months before the attack with orders to
cause confusion and impede any Soviet response to the German
1 t 7
thrusts of Operation Barbarossa. ' Even as the regular
army units crossed the border on 22 June, scores of agents
and Brandenburgers accompanied them with orders to disrupt
Soviet C by destroying telephone lines and signal centers,
and ambushing roads and rail lines. Undoubtedly, some of the
activities perpetrated by the various nationalist groups and
Brandenburg units were targets of opportunity, but it should
be clear that their activities were planned to support the
3
army scheme of maneuver by disrupting Soviet C and attacking
3key military objectives. Specific counter-C measures inclu-
ded disrupting communications, causing diversions, and
inciting subversion while specific military objectives, such
as bridges, roads, and rail lines were either seized or
destroyed, depending on the needs of the German Army.
German planners studying communications in the Soviet
Union prior to Operation 3arbarossa were hampered by a







dearth of information. The Germans intended to convert
existing Soviet long-distance communications assets for
German use but were unable to explicitly define in advance
the precise tasks awaiting them, Planning before
Barbarossa concentrated on anticipating the general under-
takings associated with the conversion of any long-distance
communications assets and the organizing of special recon-
naissance teams, composed exclusively of officers, to search
for information on Soviet communications facilities, specifi-
cally communications maps. It was not until four weeks into
the campaign that an officer uncovered a few communications
maps in a Smolensk Post Office which were subsequently
exploited to design German communications networks employing
Soviet facilities. Maps captured later facilitated German
interception of Soviet telephonic communications, although
telephone intercepts amounted to a relatively insignificant
13 8
effort on the part of the Germans.
German radio intercept operations in Operation
Barbarossa were a function of the communications service of
each separate branch of the Armed Forces and concentrated
mainly on long range operations, exclusive of shortwave
transmissions. The Army signal intercept organization, for
example, consisted of evaluation centers at OKH and Army
Group levels, intercept companies at Army level, and communi
139
cations intelligence platoons at Division level. The






intercept companies and communications intelligence platoons
both possessed direction finding capabilities but only the
intercept company processed encrypted signals. The objec-
tive of signal intercept operations planned by Army Group
South, for example, was to ascertain the organization and
distribution of forces of the Red Army and Air Force in
European Russia west of the Urals. Colonel Randewig,
Commander of Intercept Troops for Army Group South, descri-
bed the mission of the intercept companies in his command
as fourfold:
1) to analyze the operational technique of the enemy,
2) to analyze the network structure, relationships, and
organization of the units.
3) to cryptoanalyze field ciphers, and
14
4) to perform final evaluation.
The 7th, 3d, and 57th Intercept Companies were assigned to
the 11th, 17th, and 6thArmiesi respectively, in Army Group
South and for Operation Barbarossa were tasked to collect
radio intelligence in front of their respective armies
to develop the information specified in the radio intercept
company mission described above.
The intelligence platoons at division level were limited
to clear text intercepts only but performed missions similar








Orders on the March: German Command, Control,




the extent of such activity is still unclear, the Germans
apparently did plan, to a very limited degree, to actively
enter Soviet communications channels to manipulate those
channels and deceive the enemy.
Despite the enormous potential of airborne operations in
disrupting an opponent's command, control, and communica-
tions, airborne operations were conspicuously absent from
the planning of Operation Barbarossa, although Directive #21
specifically discussed the "bold employment of parachute and
airborne troops" against Russian railways. Neither side
conducted military airborne operations during Operation
Barbarossa, nor was there evidence to suggest any such
operations were planned. It should be noted, however, that
some agents and members of the Brandenburg Regiment para-
chuted into the Soviet Union shortly before the 22nd of June
to gather intelligence and attack special targets but
precise details are lacking and the magnitude of any such
infiltrations can only be conjectured. The failure of
Germany to plan airborne operations for Operation Barbarossa
should not be considered as an affirmation of a negative
3
potential of such operations in a counter-C role. The
absence of airborne operations is more likely explained by
the fact that, after the German airborne operations in Crete
142 Erickson, Stalingrad, pp. 101-135.
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20 May - l June 1941), the Germans did not possess suffi-
cient airborne units or air transport to allow such
operations in Operation Barbarossa. 143
One plan extremely well conceived by the Germans was an
extensive psychological warfare effort to encourage Soviet
soldiers to surrender and to cause disruption and disorgani-
zation in the Soviet C System by the removal of entire
units from the war. The German psychological warfare
campaign against the Soviets was a massive undertaking
compared to similar operations in previous campaigns.
During Operation Barbarossa the Germans used leaflets, loud-
speakers, and radio broadcasts to advertise their propaganda
enticing surrender with an 'honorable captivity'. They very
perceptively tailored the leaflets to the Red Army soldiers
who were suffering quick, crushing defeats during the early
days of Operation Barbarossa. An example of one of the
appealing, persuasive leaflets disseminated on 15 July 1941
is provided in Appendix C.
Did the Germans develop a plan to disrupt, disorganize,
and otherwise manipulate Soviet Command, Control, and
Communications during Operation Barbarossa? No evidence has
143 Generaloberst Hellmuth Remhardt, Evaluation of
German Airborne OpeFations (Unpublished Foreign Military






Captain John Buchsbaum, German Psychological Warfare
on the Russian Front 1941-1945 [Typescript Office of the





been uncovered that clearly indicates any well-defined,
specific counter-C plan for Operation Barbarossa. German
sources investigated, in particular personal interviews
conducted, were in unanimous agreement that no plan, in fact
existed. As perhaps the best support of this contention
that no plan existed, is the emphatic statement of Capt.
von Luttichau that no counter-C doctrine was taught in the
military intelligence school he attended before Operation
Barbarossa, nor did he observe any counter-C -3 plan during the
conflict. It should be noted, however, that German plan-
ning for Operation Barbarossa did include many isolated
activities designed to support the rapid advances envisioned
but which would, in fact, produce disruptive effects upon
3
any C system. Perhaps it is such planning for the ancil-
lary support of Operation Barbarossa which has led some
Soviets to the firm conclusion that the German forces did,
indeed, employ a counter-C plan. Consider that the offi-
cial Soviet History of the Great Patriotic War recounts the
"Increasing efforts of the enemy to destroy and disorganize
146
the system of state communications." Aleksandr Nekrich,
himself veteran of the Eastern Front but more renowned as a
historian of the German invasion, related his belief that
the German counter-C plan first interrupted critical tele-
phone communications, then bombed staffs and communications
145 • t
Interview, von Luttichau.
146The Great Patriotic War, p. 175,
88

units, and finally employed signals intelligence and code
breaking techniques. The divergence of opinion between
the Soviet and German sources can be explained, quite
reasonably, by the fact that the Soviets were the recipients
of any counter-C activity, planned or otherwise, while the
Germans were the perpetrators of such activity. Certainly
the massive, quick, catastrophic encirclements planned by
the Germans were designed to shatter all elements of the Red
Forces in their paths including their command, control, and
communications. The peripheral effects of these bold
maneuvers must have appeared to the Soviets as a concerted
effort to disrupt their command, control, and communications,
It is interesting to speculate concerning the reason the
Germans did not develop any plans for countering Soviet
command, control, and communications during Operation
Barbarossa. Since C was not recognized as such in 1941,
3perhaps the Germans simply ignored C considerations when
planning Operation Barbarossa. This reasoning is shallow
3
especially when one considers the highly refined C system
employed by German forces, for example Panzer Group 2,
148during Operation Barbarossa. In view of the German's low
esteem for Soviet communications, they may have reasoned
3
that no action was necessary against Soviet C since it
Interview, Nekrich.
148 See Praun, Signal Communications , for a detailed




rH 1 U C , ^
> O -H >
s ex •H
« < H U r-;
m o3 oS U
P. e H
• <HI 03
03 t/5 O <D c/)
d d CD
d O V5 o T3
o +-> <d dX 'rJ 3
4-) C<l U CD CQ
rH • d -MHO'H d
3 3
X!T3 1^1 O O
<D LD g +->
V5 x • o
o3 oo 5 X
S'ri ojcq Ph
CD rH M
^ 5 -H CL,
d x
03 T3 £ <U
+-> d X
03 X E- •
T3 P- tn
d a e CD
03 OOCM • U
£ .H K1 4-> HEX d O
o m CD <-H
U = o 6
vO PiXJ
4-> - T3 -H CDX LT) CD 3 H
oo © o* o
•H T3 P- 0) C^




£ o; £ cd 00
H T3 'H fn u
CD -H X 03U 2 03 i-t rH
£ 3
c/i r M-i rH
•H oi n3 !- o
X - CD H
E- vo O S •M
+-> O dPO
• OO £ u
d d cq t3
CD o m d o
00 rH CU 03 +->
03
5 : cd ^ w
c/> co X cd 5h
r—
1
- +-> H CD
r* K) UT3
0) r-t t3 d
M-l cd d a3
<D T3 <—I 03 eX CD rH 6 6
H 0) 1 o
fH P CU O u
cu in o ^
N 03 U +-> T3
d a> p. CD
03 S <D s
O, CD X O
fl c+j rH
$h d -h rH
O o3 O0T3 03
d cd
~ (/) CD +-> T3
£ «H O d
ffl ifl ftl) 03
N (/) X -M
Cu o3 o O dX o U 3
< U rH a, 00
90

would logically deteriorate as the communications facili-
ties became overloaded in the normal course of events.
Such a line of reasoning conflicts with the multitude of
3
activities planned, and executed, to stun Soviet C into
disorganization and disarray at the very beginning of
Operation Barbarossa. The Germans apparently respected
Soviet C enough to initiate specific precautions to assist
its deterioration. The most probable reasoning, in retro-
spect, is that the Germans were confident their plan was
quite sufficient to destroy the Soviets quickly, in perhaps
three months or less, and planning other activities that did
not directly result in the destruction or elimination of
Soviet soldiers, for example destroying Soviet command,
control, and communications was not productive. The German
Whermacht knew that speed and surprise were the key ingre-
dients required for the rapid destruction of the Red Army,
and German objectives were best accomplished thru maximum
use of those two elements.
91

IV. OPERATION BARBAROSSA AND ITS IMPACT ON
SOVIET"COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS
German field commanders completed the final tactical
planning for Operation Barbarossa during the night of 21-22
June 1941, briefed their troops with last minute instruc-
tions, and read the Fuehrer's personal order to his soldiers
The Germans had executed their deception plans (see Chapter
III) superbly and succeeded in concealing from the Soviets
the concentration of over 3,200,000 German troops and their
equipment for the Blitzkreig into Russia. Although the
Soviets had heard tank engines across the border and ob-
served an occasional reconnaissance aircraft they had no con
ception of the potential for horror and destruction massed
opposite them as the first artillery rounds were fired at
149
0305 in the north and 0315 farther south on 22 June 1941.
Even before the artillery fired its heavy concentrations,
agents of various nationalist organizations and members of
the Brandenburg Regiment had unobtrusively infiltrated the
Soviet border, although not without difficulty. The Germans
generally had difficulty in introducing agents into the
During the six months preceding Barbarossa 17,000
trains rolled eastward with war materials. For their attack
on the Soviet Union the Germans had deployed over 3,200,000
men- -141 divisions of which 19 were Panzer--3 , 350 tanks,
7,184 artillery pieces, 600,000 lorries and a like number of
horses, and over 2,000 aircraft. See Generaloberst Franz




Soviet Union because of the strict Soviet border controls;
in fact, eight Ukrainians of the Organization of Ukrainian
Nationalists (OUN) were intercepted by NKVD guards in the
ten days preceding the attack. Those who successfully
crossed into Russia proceeded to execute their carefully
3
orchestrated assignments and to disrupt Soviet C by preclu-
ding the collection and dissemination of information about
the attack, interfering with command and control, and gener-
ally disrupting the Soviet response to the German invasion.
Near Brest, for example, in the Western Special Military
District opposite Army Group Center, the Soviet 4th Army had
interrogated a German deserter who had crossed the border
near Volchin during the night of 21 June 1941, At 0220 the
next morning 4th Army officials attempted to disseminate the
results of their interrogation concerning the impending
German attack and discovered that their telephone lines had
been cut. The destruction of the lines had been carried out
by infiltrators from across the Reich border. Even before
this time, 4th Army had been cognizant of the interruption
in Brest of the electric power and water supply and the tele-
phone system. These interruptions were apparently inflicted
by Brandenburgers who were dressed as Red Army soldiers and'
who were also at work seizing bridges and spreading alarm
l3
°Xielsen, Intelligence for the German Air Force , p. 139
151 See John Erickson, "The Soviet Response to Surprise
Attack: Three Directives, 22 June 1941." Soviet Studies ,




and contusion. *" The damaging of communications partly iso
lated the Soviet 4th Army and had much graver consequences
than the simple inability to distribute an interrogation
report, albeit an important one. At 0030 on 22 June, the
Soviet High Command had transmitted a warning order for the
German attack and directed units to prepare for combat and
disperse aircraft on all field aerodromes. The Soviet 4th
Army did not receive this directive until 0550, too late to
be of value since the Germans had already begun their attack
earlier at 0315 when the Luftwaffe attacked the neatly
aligned rows of Soviet aircraft and Army Group Center cap-
tured intact the six Bug River bridges guarded by the Soviet
4th Army. Other units did not receive official warning
of the German attack until 0800, almost five hours after the
onslaught began. The loss of communications by the Head-
quarters, 4th Army, before the attack was not an isolated
incident. As far south as Sevastopol on the Black Sea,
communications had also been cut as a prelude to the initial
German assault. At 0320 the commander of the Sevastopol
garrison, Maj or-General Morgunov, realized his communica-
tions had been tampered with while attempting to black out
the city as German aircraft approached. Communications
between Moscow and the Sevastopol Naval Headquarters,





however, continued to function as before.
As German regular army units crossed the border shortly
after 0505 in the north and 0515 farther south, diversionists
and saboteurs accompanied them to proliferate the disruption
begun by their comrades earlier in support of the German
advance. The goal of the initial efforts of the diversion-
ists and saboteurs was to stun Soviet C*3 and hinder Soviet
response to the attack of the German Army and Luftwaffe.
German commandos accomplished this goal by severing communi-
cations links to prevent the exchange of intelligence and the
issuance of orders. The Soviet History of the Great
Patriotic War recounts that, "After the first shot,.. the
diversionists cut communication lines linking headquarters
-
army-corps and corps -divis ions . " The communication lines
referred to were apparently telephone and telegraph lines.
German commandos also seized key transportation facilities,
particularly bridges, to facilitate the rapid advance of the
mobile German formations and interrupt Soviet attempts to
establish any cohesive defense. In Army Group North's area
alone, Lithuanian activists seized twenty-four important
bridges during Barbarossa. On 22 June Brandenburgers
assisted Army Group Center units capture intact all bridges
1S4 ibid.
155 The Great Patriotic War
,
p. 12.
156Heinz Hohne , Canaris (New York, 1979), p. 460.
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German infantry troops of Army Group Center (above) cross
the Bug River 24 kilometers east of Chelin on 22 June 1941
and advance on the Soviet side of the Bug (below) to engage
the enemy. (Photos: Bundesarchiv)
'4 ^*












across the Bug River as part of that Army group's first move
157into Soviet territory. Still further south, elements of
the Brandenburg Regiment established a bridgehead over the
15 8San River for Army Group South.
Airborne even before the artillery concentrations began
at between 0505 and 0315, the Luftwaffe struck Soviet air-
fields, communications facilities, and transportation
targets with great effectiveness during the early hours of
Operation Barbarossa. Striking all airfields in range, the
Luftwaffe dazed the Red Air Force and materially destroyed
it on the first day and achieved air superiority within two
159
or three days. The Luftwaffe struck sixty-six airfields
in the border military districts and by noon destroyed
1,200 Soviet aircraft, 800 of which had been on the ground
when destroyed. More than half of those aircraft lost
on the ground were in the Western Military District where
528 planes were annihilated before take-off and 210 more




15 8Hohne , Canaris
,
p. 460.
Compare Plocher, The German Air Force
,
p. 85, and










1 f\ ?disseminate Marshal Timoshenko's warning order " provided
neatly aligned, easily destroyed, rows of Soviet aircraft
as targets for the Luftwaffes's first wave of bombers. Not
surprisingly, the early, immensely successful Luftwaffe
attacks astounded the Red Air Force and achieved air suprem-
acy for the German Air Force. As a consequence of the
success of the initial attacks, the Luftwaffe was able to
turn its attention quickly to supporting ground operations.
Not all of the Luftwaffe was totally preoccupied with
the Soviet Air Force on 22 June 1941, as some German planes
attacked Soviet communications and control facilities. The
V Air Corps , under General der Flieger Robert Ritter von
Greim, supported Army Group South in the Zamosc-Lublin area
and attacked the main telegraph office and army telephone
exchange in Lvov and a divisional telephone exchange in
Lutsk. J Further north in the Baltic Military District
German bombers destroyed large amounts of equipment and
severed the communications of the 8th and 11th Soviet Armies
as these units protected the approaches to the towns of
Vilna, Riga, and Shauliya. Coincidentally , the 11th Army
had received no orders at the time the Luftwaffe shattered
its communications. It was not until almost 0600, almost
The warning order issued from Moscow at 0030, 22 June
was actually Soviet Directive Number 1, the first of three
issued by the Soviet High Command on 22 June. See Erickson,
"The Soviet Response."
163 Plocher, The German Air Force , pp. 51-53,
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three hours after the German artillery opened fire, that the
5th Rifle Division of the Soviet 11th Army finally received
some instructions. As the officers of the 5th Division
observed from high ground the German advances , they received
orders not to engage in operations since the German activi-
164ties were merely a provocation. The initial, stunning, y
successful air attacks against Soviet communications de-
graded the abilities of higher command staffs, that is corps
and front levels, to collect accurate, timely information,
to disseminate orders and to control the forces executing
those orders. The Soviets were likewise powerless to
coordinate their mechanized forces in effective counter-
attacks because of severed telephone lines, destroyed radios,
and the frightening influence of German air strikes on the
Soviet troops. The Soviets in general experienced
unusual difficulty from the very first in controlling their
16 7
forces during Operation Barbarossa.
The German Air Force was also very successfully occupied
striking other targets for which there appears no clearly
evident pattern. As the Luftwaffe attacked cities near the




163 The Great Patriotic War
,
p. 12,
Compare Albert Seaton, The Russo-German War (New York,
1971), and Erickson, The Soviet High Command , p. 597,


















































































causing chaos in the
bureaucracy coordinating reserve mobilization. Undoubt-
edly the general commotion produced by German air activity
far behind the front compounded the normal disorganization
incident to the reserve mobilization process, a process
that consumed many days for some units like the 100th Order
169
of Lenin Rifle Division near Minsk. German pilots were
at work at 0530 in the Western Special Military District
purveying confusion and disorder by attacking 4th Army
Headquarters at Kobrin and literally blowing it to
pieces. ' The Germans apparently observed an unwritten /
rule against destroying enemy headquarters. Such attacks
could cause a total collapse in Soviet command and control
and hinder the quick, orderly destruction of the Soviet
military since subordinate units, lacking control from
171
above, would inadvertently disperse. In contrast, it
appears Soviet headquarters were targets when their de-
struction would delay or prevent a successful withdrawal
or promising counter-attack. It is quite possible that
control of the Soviet 4th Army forces after only two hours
of battle was no longer an important consideration since










171 Interview, von Luttichau.
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Army units in the course of its initial, thunderous advance.
It is interesting to note that 4th Army had attempted to
relocate its command post to establish more reliable C 3
with its subordinate commands but had not received authority
from the Front to move until the German bombers were well
17^
enroute to Kobrin.
The Luftwaffe also unleashed its destructive powers on
Soviet transportation facilities on the first day of battle.
By attacking such targets as the Bialystok railway sta-
tion German pilots denied rail lines to Soviet forces
reinforcing units already succumbing to the lethal blows of
the German Army. Initially, transportation targets were
less important than Soviet air and communications assets
but assumed increasing priority as the conflict progressed
and the Russian Air Force was eliminated as the primary Air
Force concern. German air and artillery fires also struck
fortified frontier positions, the Soviet border guards ad-
vancing to occupy these positions, and Red Army troops
designated to back-up border guard units. The Soviets
themselves have written that,
"The sudden mass blows, carried out by German avia-
tion and artillery, on the troops in the border districts
considerably hindered Soviet covering troops from joining
the battle in any organized manner. The situation was
further complicated by the fact that aerial and artillery










most of the communications lines and networks. As a
result, staffs of the front were unable to give firm
direction to the troops, and conversely, were unable
to get firm information on the tactical situation from
the soldiers at the front. "^'^
In this way, German supporting fires prevented the forma-
tion of any defense envisioned in the 1941 defense plan.
The Luftwaffe achieved particular success against vehicular
columns, tank units on the march, and rail movements. Once
again the official Soviet History of the Great Patriotic
War relates how "the enemy continued to make heavy, mass,
air strikes against our troops as they moved forward to
occupy fortified frontier positions." It continues,
"They also bombed artillery positions, as well as tank units
moving into position on the frontier. In addition, they
straffed vehicular columns." ' Alan Clark, in his classic
volume Barbarossa described the Luftwaffe activity against
transportation targets in the Western District as follows,
"Roads and railways were raked by the Luftwaffe, some units
had their effectiveness reduced by as much as half while on
the march." Further north, for example, on 22 June the
48th Soviet Rifle Division was enroute from Riga in the
Baltic Military District to the border when it came under
air attack at Raseynyay, about 60 kilometers south of
Shyaulyay, The Soviet History of the Great Patriotic War
T V A






176Alan Clark, Barbarossa (London, 1965), p. 46
104

1 1 II p I
105

continues that the 48th Division then "was attacked by
German ground forces ,... suffered great losses, and never
reached the frontier. It was destroyed."
All other actions as daring, swift, and crushing as
they may have been, were only secondary and supportive of
the main Army drives to rapidly destroy the Soviet Armed
Forces. The three German Army Groups achieved almost total
surprise along the entire front when German artillery open-
ed Barbarossa by destroying Soviet fortifications, communi-
cations lines, opposing artillery units, and obstructing
178 /
enemy observation of German advances. Surprise was so ^
complete that Brandenburg units and regular army units of
Army Group Center captured intact every bridge over the
179
Bug River in that Army Group area. Behind the border
itself, air and artillery fires caught Soviet Frontier
Troops in their barracks or racing half-dressed to occupy
their positions. Many of these positions remained empty
as German panzers advanced swiftly through the Soviet
180border defenses. Elsewhere, the Soviet Air Force, its
fighters and bombers neatly aligned wing to wing, unexpec-
tedly awaited the surprise appearance of the Luftwaffe.
Only Major-General M.V. Zakharov, commander of the still
The Great Patriotic War
,
p. 12.
178 See The Great Patriotic War .
1 7 Q


































































forming 9th Army in the Odessa Military District, ordered
his aircraft dispersed before dawn, a precaution he insti-
tuted on his own initiative, without authorization from
181higher headquarters.
German panzer units pierced the Soviet defenses with
deep, swift penetrations such as were previously unknown to
the Soviet military. Simultaneously German units effected
the day to day task of killing enemy soldiers and destroy-
ing their units. The amazing depth achieved by these
armored drives in just one day of battle is remarkable of
itself, but these drives are also worthy of note because
they are indicative of a counter-C phenomena prevalent
throughout Operation Barbarossa. Consider the advance of
General feldmarshall von Manstein's 56 Panzer Corps of Army
Group .North, towards Daugaupils and Dvinsk. The 56th
Panzer Corps advanced 80 kilometers in each of the first
two days of Barbarossa, in other words, Manstein's panzers
moved over 100 miles beyond the Soviet border in just two
18 2 3days. Even without the specific intent to disrupt C
,
such an amazingly quick, deep penetration as that of the
56th Panzer Corps, slicing so deeply into the enemy
defenses, caused catastrophic disruptions of the opposi-




18 2 Clark, Barbarossa, p. 44.
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General feldmarsha 11 Manstein's own description of the
disorder induced by his unit's movement is worthy of
consideration
.
"A tank drive such as 56 Panzer Corps made to
Dvinsk inevitably generates confusion and panic in
the enemy communication zone; it ruptures the enemy
chain of command and makes it virtually impossible
for him to coordinate his counter-measures . "183
Not only was the physical presence of an opposing
panzer corps 80 kilometers behind the Soviet border up-
setting to the Soviets on that first day of Barbarossa but
the manner of its arrival certainly disrupted their lateral
C along the way. Consider that the 56th Panzer Corps
destroyed several units along its advance and, by so doing,
also eliminated the C connectivity provided by those units
Further the passage of hundreds of panzers inevitably must
have physically destroyed communication even if only by
crushing telephone and telegraph lines and by capturing or
intimidating messengers and couriers. 56th Panzer Corps
undoubtedly by-passed Soviet reinforcements proceeding to
the front, reinforcements who discovered they had in fact
been by-passed and cut off from all avenues of withdrawal
and C . Finally, the rapid drive of the German panzer
columns surely stunned Soviet commmands and precluded the
employment of their defense plans to resist the attack from
the west. 184
10 7
Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories (Chicago, 1958),
p. 186.
184 See Mueller-Hillebrand, Army Group Operations .
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General feldmar shall Erich von Manstein, the brilliant
commander of the German 56th Panzer Corps during Operation
Barbarossa and perhaps the finest German strategist of
World War II. (Photo: Bundesarchiv)
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Enjoying surprise, offense, and mass the Germans
generated bone -crushing attacks which jarred the opposing
Soviet units and, by the sheer physical momentum of the
attack, jolted Soviet C into ineffectiveness. For example,
the 11th Army covered the southern flank of the Baltic
Military District at its boundary with 3d Army of the
Western Special Military District. Army Group Center en-
joyed particular success at this point, attacking with such
strength that the 11th Army units were scattered or destroy-
ed. The unexpected movement within 11th Army in response
to the enemy attack destroyed communications between the
army staff and subordinate commands, precluded intelligence
18 5
reporting and prevented a coordinated response. Mean-
while Lieutenant -General Kuznetsov's 3d Army, opposing the
9th German Army, had lost all telephone and radio communi-
cations within the first hour of battle and, except for
runners, was isolated from the 11th Army to the north, the
10th Army to the south, and the Western Front to the
rear. The 10th Army was in a similar predicament since
its telephones had been severed and its radio communica-
1 Q1
tions jammed. ' Obviously such a bleak situation preven-
ted an accurate assessment by Soviet commands at all levels
and precluded a coordinated, strategic response.






187Werth, Russia at War, p. 15 3.
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The same dazed, uninformed conditions prevalent in the
Western Military District pervaded Moscow as well since it
too suffered from failing communications. After almost
seventeen hours of battle the 'center' in Moscow issued
Directive Number 3 ordering the Northwestern, Western, and
Southwestern Fronts to take offensive action using coordina
ted operations and carry the war to enemy territory.
Marshal Timoshenko reflected the general confusion of 22
June in Directive Number 3 by ordering attacks at unrealis-
tic times by already damaged mechanized forces which were
to be supported by Soviet planes unable to survive in the
air against the Luftwaffe. The Fronts experienced extreme
difficulty in complying with Directive Number 3 by attemp-
18 8
ting to implement it as directed.
To fully appreciate the German disruption of Soviet
command, control, and communications on 22 June, consider
the case of the Western Special Military District and the
disruptive actions and effects which occurred in that
Military District and which are listed in Figure VI. The
Western Special Military District had operating within it
the 3d, 10th, and 4th Soviet Armies which defended approxi-
mately 470 kilometers of the Soviet frontier in Belorussia
189from Porjetsche in the north to Tehrush in the south.
German Army Group Center, specifically the entire German
188 See Erickson, "The Soviet Response."
189
Erickson, Stalingrad, p. 71.
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The Panzer Leaders of Army Group Center:
Generaloberst Guderian (left), Commander, Panzer Group 2
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4th Army and Panzer Group 2 and elements of the German 9th
Army and Panzer Group 5 attacked the Western Special Mili-
tary District at 0515 on 22 June 1941. Shortly after 0315
the Soviet 3d Army in the north lost its telephone and radio
communications with the adjacent Soviet 11th Army of the
Baltic Military District further north and the Soviet 10th
Army to the south, as well as the Western Special Military
District to the rear in Minsk. Messengers were the only
190
means of communications available to the 3d Army. Some
time during 22 June the 3d Army Staff was annihilated by a
191Luftwaffe raid. The Soviet 10th Army was in a very
similar situation since it had also lost communications
with Western District Headquarters at the very beginning of
Barbarossa and still lacked communications with the Soviet
19 24th Army to the south at 1600. 4th Army was likewise
unable to communicate with 10th Army to the north and the
Soviet 5th Army just to the south in the Kiev Special
xMilitary District. Even before the Germans fired their
first shot, 4th Army had lost all radio and telephone com-
munications with District Headquarters. 4th Army reestab-
lished communications with Minsk only to lose them again at




191AGC, IC, Daily Reports, 22.6.41 - 15.7.41
Budesarchiv Freiburg RH 1911/123, p. 12 of file.
192 Erickson, Stalingrad, p. 129.
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193Kobrin. * It was not until 1600 that the Western Special
Military District was able to reach 4th Army, this time by
194telegraph. One can see that on at least one day, the
first and perhaps most important day of Operation Barbarossa,
communications on the Military District-Army level in the
crucial Western Special Military District was almost totally
lacking. Given that communications functioned normally
between the Military District and Moscow, one still per-
ceives a catastrophic disruption of communications, and
therefore C , in this particular Military District since it
could communicate with none of its subordinate armies. At
this point a critical inability to exchange information and
control forces becomes apparent.
Consider further the very illustrative example of the
Soviet 4th Army and several isolated incidents which will
demonstrate the immense disruption of command, control and
communications within 4th Army on 22 June 1941. Almost an
hour before the initial German artillery rounds slammed
into its defenses, Headquarters 4th Army discovered its
telephone lines had already been cut apparently by
Brandenburgers who were dressed as Soviet soldiers and
195
carried out additional acts of sabotage in Brest.














Panzer Division's 15 minute artillery preparation fires
began to cripple 4th Army defenses and eliminate Soviet
observation of the 17th Panzer Division's crossing of the
196Bug River. During, or perhaps shortly after the artil-
lery preparation, members of the Brandenburg Regiment and
regular army units of Army Group Center captured intact all
six Bug River bridges guarded by the Soviet 4th Army--two
19 7
road and four rail bridges. At 0330 the 4th Army re-
established communications with the Western Military
District just before the Luftwaffe began attacking that
District's airfields on which 528 planes were destroyed by
198
noon. At 0530, as 4th Army Headquarters at Kobrin
received Soviet Directive Number 1, warning of a
potential German attack, German pilots blew 4th Army Head-
quarters and its communications apart, forcing 4th Army to
199
move its headquarters to Bukhevich tnree miles away.
The best was yet to come in the form of Generaloberst
Heinz Guderian's Panzer Group 2 which advanced 80 kilom-
eters through the sector of the 4th Army by nightfall
capturing Kobrin and forcing 4th Army Headquarters to
196 Cano, German Preparations
,
p. 6.
19 7Erickson, Stalingrad .






Generaloberst Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader
(Washington, 1979), p. 155.
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displace a second time to Zapruda. By 1900 on June 22nd,
the crushing, lightning advance of Panzer Group 2 and
General feldmarshal Guenther von Kluge's German 4th Army so
devastated the Soviet 4th Army that, in the words of the
noted historian of Soviet affairs, John Erickson, "The
Soviet 4th Army was in no position to offer any effective
20 ?defense." The Soviet 4th Army did manage to fall back
in front of the thunderous, quick advance of Panzer Group 2
which by 25 June had advanced 225 kilometers through what
? n 3had been territory occupied by the 4th Army.
As Operation Barbarossa progressed after June 22nd, the
Germans continued to enjoy overwhelming successes, crushing
Soviet army units and shattering their command, control, and
communications. During Barbarossa, nationalist agents and
Brandenburg units continuously supported the operations of
those armies to which they were assigned by seizing strate-
gic objectives, cutting rail lines , severing telephonic
communications, and proliferating general disorder. These
commandos were particularly active in front of Army Group
North where members of the Brandenburg Regiment posed as
Soviet casualties and used two captured lorries to seize the













advancing 56th Panzer Corps." Elsewhere Lithuanian acti-
vists seized twenty-four key bridges in advance of
General feldmar shall Busch's 16th Army and ant i -communists
in a Lithuanian Division at Vilna shot their political
20 5commissars and turned their unit over to the Germans.
In Lemberg, Ukrainian members of the Brandenburg Regiment
seized the local radio transmitter on the night of 29-30
June and spread disorder among the local populace and
military by proclaiming an independent West Ukrainian
c- * 206State
.
The Luftwaffe was incredibly successful during the
first few days of the war, destroying over 2,500 enemy
aircraft and achieving air superiority over the Soviet Air
Force in front of Army Group Center within the first three
days. General fel'dmarshall Kesselring's Second Air Fleet,
Army Group Center, quickly extended its air superiority to
air supremacy and shifted operations from destroying the
Red Air Force to providing direct and indirect support to
207ground operations. As the Germans advanced eastward,
the Luftwaffe continued to engage enemy air units as they
came into range but Second Air Fleet directed its primary
effort against troop concentrations, roads, rail lines, and
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counter-attack formations. Initially the Luftwaffe raked
rail lines and road columns to foil couterattacks and re-
inforcement operations. Air power depleted many road col-
umns by as much as 50% and caused units traveling by rail
20 8
to disembark well short of their destination. For
example, Army Group Center's 9th Army was advancing near
Grodno and Kuznica on the afternoon of 24 June when the
Soviets attacked from Bialystak and Lunna. Generalfeld -
marshall von Richtofen directed his entire VIII Air Corps
against the Soviet counter-attack and by evening the com-
bined German air-ground effort had stopped the Soviet
?09
counter-attack and destroyed 105 tanks."
Later in Operation Barbarossa, when it became apparent
that the Soviets were withdrawing from their forward loca-
tions to establish a new line of defense further east, the
Luftwaffe impeded their retreat by attacking withdrawing
units and their headquarters to prevent, or at least dis-
organize, their retrograde movements. Consider Army Group
North's attack east from the Dvina on 2 July. I Air Corps
began supporting this drive by attacking Soviet fortifica-
tions but quickly shifted operations on 3 July to interdict
Soviet rail and road retrograde movements forced by the
















encirclement at Minsk by Army Group Center, the German Air
Force interdicted rail movements and attacked road columns
and river crossings to destroy the enemy fleeing encircle-
ment at Smolensk. The V Air Corps supported the advance of
Army Group South to the Stalin Line and between 6 and 9 July
shattered heavy Soviet counter-attacks, particularly those
directed against the 9th German Panzer Division at
Birdichev. Following the German breach of the Stalin Line,
V Air Corps struck the Dnepr River bridges at Cherkassy,
Kanex, Kiev, and Gornostaypol and concentrated on moving
columns and railroads of the increasing Soviet retrograde
7 11
movements." On 12 July the Luftwaffe began to interdict
the advance of Russian reinforcements east of the Dnepr and,
on 14 July the rail junction at Bakhmach was successfully
attacked. German air power also attacked vehicular traffic
and troop traffic centers in the Proskurov-Staro-
212Konstantinov area inflicting particularly heavy losses.
German air superiority directly frustrated the utiliza-
tion of surviving Soviet C . By exposing Soviet formations
the Luftwaffe denied the element of surprise to those
forces still under effective Soviet control. For example,
following the Minsk encirclement, air reconnaissance provi-
ded Generaloberst Guderian with extremely critical intelli-
















" Aware of this information, Panzer Group 2 suc-
cessfully continued its advance in spite of these unexpected
enemy units. Further, consider the 210th Bomber Wing
supporting Generaloberst Hoth's Panzer Group 3 from 22 June
to 26 July. This wing alone destroyed 165 tanks, 2,136
motor vehicles, 52 trains, and destroyed or disabled 60
2 14locomotives." By 13 July, only three weeks into
Operation Barbarossa, the Wehrmacht believed the German
Air Force attacks on the Russian railroad had already
prevented any possibility of large-scale Soviet counter-
215
attack. The Soviets in many instances were reduced even
beyond the disadvantaged position they occupied on 22 June.
They were forced to react to German initiatives but were
unable to coordinate their forces without German knowledge
or to seize the initiative themselves.
On the ground the German Army capitalized on its spec-
tacular successes of the first day and penetrated Soviet
territory at breakneck speed to encircle and destroy the
Red Army. As mentioned earlier, Manstein's 56th Panzer










Ibid., p. 56. Compare with Schwabedissen, The
Russian Air Force
, pp. 157-158 regarding the minimal effect
of air activity on the Soviet Transportation System.
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As the German forces proceeded they destroyed some enemy
units and forced others to redeploy or retreat, in both
instances disrupting their C . For example, as Army Group
Center advanced towards Moscow, it effected two great
encirclements. By so doing it completely isolated those
Soviet forces within the enclosed pockets and severed their
links to higher headquarters. By 8 July the Germans had
captured some 290,000 Soviets in the Bialystok area, inclu-
ding entire corps, and, by 5 August another 300,000 sol-
diers had surrendered at Smolensk. While advancing over
500 miles in only 45 days Army Group Center had taken
approximately 600,000 prisoners and destroyed or captured
over 5,000 tanks. General fel dmarshall von Bock's Army
Group was only 250 miles from Moscow. The incomprehen-
sible, massive losses of men and material sustained by the
Soviets surely detracted from the Soviet war effort and
gravely degredated its C"\ In the Bialystok and Smolensk
encirclement the Germans eliminated entire divisions,
complete corps from the Soviet balance. Not only were the
Soviets unable to command, control, or communicate with
these units, but the Soviet command structure could not
rely on their services in any way. Such is perhaps the
3
ultimate disruption of C .
The Germans directed an enormous psychological warfare
effort against the Red Army and achieved the surrender of







Russian soldiers being captured (above) by Army Group North
and (below) by the 25th Panzer Regiment, Army Group Center





















individuals and small groups as well as entire battal-
01
-
ions." ' Consider that 140 million leaflets \vrere air-
dropped by 16 August 1941, the earliest date for which
statistics were available, and that other means such as
loudspeakers and radio broadcasts were also used.
Gene ralfeldmar shall V.'olfrom von Richtofen, VIII Air Corps
Commander, has related that, by 11 July, the leaflet pro-
gram had indeed produced tangible results and that Soviet
deserters indicated many more Red soldiers were ready to
desert but were afraid to do so without their own indivi-
dual leaflet, or "Special life insurance certificate" as
they called it. Thereupon the Luftwaffe produced and
distributed briefer leaflets valid for several persons. As
7 10
a result the number of deserters clearly increased." The
overall German psychological warfare effort reduced the
number of Soviet soldiers in the field opposing the German
forces and disrupted the C of at least those commands,
regiments and higher, from which battalions deserted.
The fiercely intense tempo and surprise of German
operations simplified their tactical signals intelligence
task because many normally encoded Soviet radio transmis-
sions were sent in the clear to achieve battle expediency.
Throughout the war against the Soviet Union the Germans
7 17
'See Buchsbaum, German Psychological Warfare for a
detailed analysis of the German Psychological Warfare effort
and its effects.
218 See Plocher, The German Air Force, p. 99.
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considered the information produced by their signals intel-
1 19ligence service as extremely credible.'' For example
Generaloberst Haider, Chief of the German General Staff
noted in his diary entry for 31 July 1941 information
produced by signals intelligence which delineated the new
Soviet Army command structure instituted on 10 July, com-
2 20plete with the names of the new theater commanders.
Earlier, as Panzer Group 2 advanced towards Smolensk on 6
July, signals intelligence informed Generaloberst Guderian
of a new army headquarters directly to his front in the
Orsha area. Aware of this information, Generaloberst
Guderian realized he would have to hasten his attack and
did, in fact, successfully achieve his objective at
Smolensk despite the participation of an unexpected army in
2 1
the battle."
Divisions generally responded quicker to signals intel-
ligence produced by their own signals intelligence platoon
222
than was possible at Army level. Consider the 97th
Light Division as it attacked the village of Lubaczow on
the 22nd of June. At noon it intercepted a message indica-
ting the enemy could no longer endure the 81st Artillery
219
Nielsen, Intelligence for the German Airforce
,
p. 152













Chapter 3 describes the German signals intelligence
organization for Operation Barbarossa.
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Regiment's punishing artillery fires and would be forced to
withdraw soon. Aware of the enemy situation, the 97th
Division pressed on and quickly seized its objective by
2 9 31400. " The Germans also routinely intercepted Soviet
facsimile transmissions, but this communications medium
was mainly used by civil agencies and such interceptions
were of questionable value during Operation Barbarossa.
The Germans rarely entered Soviet radio nets for the
purpose of deceptive disruption but, during Barbarossa,
there apparently was at least one incident of the Germans
employing captured Russian radios to enter Soviet nets for
deceptive purposes. During July the Germans deceived the
Soviets into redeploying along a wooded, swampy area of the
Luga River. This threat was conveyed via Soviet radio nets
and successfully relieved the pressure on German units
establishing a bridgehead across another section of the
25Luga River.
At the highest governmental levels in Moscow C cata-
strophies occurred similar to those already discussed. In
some instances no current intelligence reached the national
decision makers because of disrupted communications links.
23 Generalleutnant J. Prinner, Advanced Combat Operations
of the 81st Artillery Regiment with the 97th Light Division
,
22 June-10 July 1941 (Unpublished Foreign Military Studies
Typescript *D-287 Historical Division USEUCOM
, 1947), p. 4.




Raus, Deceptions and Cover Plans, p. 11.
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Communications, particularly telephonic communications,
between the Stavka in Moscow and the Fronts and Armies seems
to have operated consistently but communications from the
Fronts and Armies to subordinate commands were frequently
shattered by enemy activity or disrupted by the displace-
? "7 f\
ment or destruction of those subordinate units. In
either case, the end result was one in which the Soviet
leadership in Moscow frequently was unaware of the true
2 2 7
situation developing during Operation Barbarossa and
could not make intelligent, well-informed decisions on
critical issues. The Stavka often lacked the communications
means to quickly and confidently disseminate key directives
and to control those forces involved as was the case with
Soviet Directive Number 1. In some cases the required
forces simply did not exist.
One may logically deduce that the disruption inflicted
upon the military communications system was also inflicted
upon the NKVD, Party, and Government Officials Communica-
tions Systems. It is difficult to determine the degree of
disruption of these latter communications systems but it
seems reasonable to assume that whenever the other systems
7 7 f\
The Western Military District on 22 June is a par-
ticularly good example of this situation. On 22 June and
for several days thereafter it had lost all but occasional
communications of any type with its three subordinate
armies, the 3d, 4th, and 10th. See Erickson, Stalingrad
,
pp. 101-135.
2 7 Seaton, The Russo-German War, p. 99.
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depended on the same communications facilities as the mili-
tary system, the disruption was roughly the same in all
systems. When the other communications systems utilized
facilities separate from the military communications
facilities the other systems very likely survived longer
than the military system because the civilian facilities
were less obvious to the advancing German troops who were
concentrating on military targets. As some authorities
contend, it is very possible that Stalin was frequently
better informed of battle developments than his front
commanders due to the separate Party Communications
2 2 8Systems, although it is difficult to determine exactly
how much better informed Stalin may have been.
The initial response of the national leadership of the
Soviet Union to the fatal, extensive failure of Russian
communications was the 23 June appointment of Marshal I.T.
Peresypkin, already the Manager of the Chief Directorate of
Communication of the Red Army, to the People's Commissariat
229
of Communication. Marshal Peresypkin employed several
communications battalions to secure communication between
Moscow and the Fronts. His new assignment also permitted
utilization of the state communications to support the
fronts and allowed military communications to augment the
state as required. After only one day of battle, Soviet
2 2 8
Interview, von Luttichau. See also Seaton, The
Rus so -German War
,
p. 85.
The Great Patriotic War, p. 174.
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leaders were also painfully aware of the gross inadequacies
of the governmental and military command structure, particu-
larly its inability to cope with the scope and tempo of the
German invasion. The Soviet Government and the Communist
Party immediately began to formulate a politico-military
command structure capable of responding militarily and
economically to the German attack. During Barbarossa this
command structure constantly adapted to the ominous, pro-
gressing German threat and included the addition and
deletion of several echelons of authority and decision
making bodies. Figures III and IV depict the evolution of
the Soviet Command Structure which came to include the
Stavka, State Defense Committee, and Theater Commands while
the Army Corps were eliminated. A detailed description of
the Soviet Command Structure as it unfolded during
Operation Barbarossa has been provided in Chapter II.
The stunning, paralyzing influences cast upon Soviet C J
by the German Wehrmacht during the initial days of Operation
Barbarossa were not transitory although they did diminish in
intensity as the battle moved eastward and Soviet lines of
'Z f\
communications shortened. The Germans aggressively main-
tained their offensive pressure to achieve their primary
objective of eliminating all Soviet forces and in so doing
also proliferated new C disruptions and perpetuated dis-






ravaging defeats, the Soviets attempted to recover from the
surprise of the German attack and stem the advancing German
tide in one coordinated move contained in Directive #3.
Given the confusing state of affairs existing in Russia
during June, a maneuver of such grand proportions quite
possibly could have, by itself, wreaked chaos in the Soviet
C System even without the already persistent disruption
produced by the Germans.
One final comment is appropriate concerning the multi-
tude of chance occurrences inevitable in an armed conflict
of the proportions of Operation Barbarossa. The planning
and execution of the great encirclements of Barbarossa were
remarkably successful and those encirclements produced un-
believable disorder on Soviet C"5 . Operations supporting
the great encirclements, for example air strikes and com-
mando activities, were also very successful and produced
additional disorder in Soviet C . What is difficult,
3perhaps even impossible, to describe is the counter-C
effects of those targets of opportunity fired upon, seized,
or destroyed by German forces in the field. As only one
example of this phenomenon, consider the advance of the
620th Mountain Engineer Regiment after it crossed the Upper
Dvina and seized the village of Berilawlj in July. After a
brief exchange of rifle fire elements of the battalion
seized a nearby collective farm at 0530. As part of the
attack process, the troops immediately disconnected the
telephone at the farm, as they had in the village. The
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German soldiers carried out this act rather casually but
231
nevertheless in an almost habitual manner. This
particular incident involved only two telephones. But how
many phones were destroyed, wires cut, or messengers inter-
cepted by German soldiers, performing routine duties, who
had no idea of their contribution to the disruption of
Soviet command, control, and communications?
Generalmaj or Erich Schmidt, Small Unit Tactics
(Unpublished Foreign Military Studies Typescript # fTT"0 60
j




Despite the confusion pervading the Soviet command
structure, the severed telephone lines and jammed radio
nets, the interdicted transportation facilities and the
frustrating disruptions of Soviet command, control, and
communications previously illustrated, it is the conclusion
of this thesis that the German military had formulated no
concerted counter-C plan for implementation against the
Soviets during Operation Barbarossa. The Germans did
perpetuate numerous individual actions against Soviet C
,
for example Luftwaffe strikes on telephone and telegraph
exchanges and commando raids on bridges and telephone
lines, and the jarring advances of German ground forces did
disrupt, and in some cases totally destroy Soviet C . In
spite of these actions and the effects they may have had
upon Soviet C , research into published and unpublished
English language sources and particularly interviews with
German officers who participated in Operation Barbarossa
prove conclusively that the Germans had, in fact, developed
no counter-C doctrine prior to Barbarossa and did not
execute any counter-C plan during the German attack into
Soviet Russia.
How then does one explain the numerous disruptions of
Soviet C in general and communications in particular
during the opening stages of Operation Barbarossa? Were
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those disruptions simply a normal consequence of the war
process? Is every armed force in battle susceptible to
similar disruptions? In all likelihood other military
forces will suffer many C"5 disruptions similar to those
encountered by the Soviets during Barbarossa, although not
necessarily for the same reasons. The Germans disrupted
Soviet C by well -planned, superbly executed, swift, deep
penetrations which destroyed entire units, coincidentally
destroyed their C -5 , and violently displaced other Soviet
units, which almost by chance, severed their communications
both up and down the chain of command. Other units lost
much of their capability to command and control because
they interfaced with units which had already been dis-
placed, destroyed, or otherwise disrupted. Also contribut-
ing to the disruption of Soviet C were those operations,
which spread disorder among the military and the civilian
populace and seized or destroyed communications and tran-
portation facilities.
The war itself, in addition to the disruption noted
above, caused much disruption of C , although it is diffi-
cult to determine what proportion of the disruption was
attributable to the general effects of the war. The
general confusion normally generated during the prosecution
of hostilities is commonly referred to as the 'fog of war'
and is a factor which should not be overlooked. Confusion
inevitably arises from the sudden, unexpected occurrence
of certain complicated, grave situations. Different
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individuals have different perspections of these grave
situations and these perspections affect the quality of
information they report on any given situation. The various
reports submitted by different reporters can combine to
present a more or less complete description of the real
situation. This reporting process forces a decision element
removed from the actual occurrence to make a decision based
on information which does not fully convey the true situa-
tion. The varying abilities of people to express informa-
tion clearly and completely and the inevitability that
certain facts may never be known combine to contribute
additional confusion.
In addition to the disruptive influences discussed
above, it is a further conclusion of this thesis that the
Germans disrupted Soviet C in essentially the three
following ways
:
1) Certain definite acts which were not part of a
general German counter-C"5 doctrine for the beginning of a
major offensive but which were clearly designed to disrupt
Soviet command, control, and communications in support of
the army scheme of maneuver.
2) Unexpected disruptive effects derived from other
well executed Luftwaffe, artillery , etc. , supporting opera-
tions; and
3) Bonus effects resulting from violent, aggressive
Army operations which achieved surprise and penetrated,
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encircled, and destroyed substantial elements of the
Soviet armed forces.
Consider, for example, the disruption of command, con-
trol, and communications manifest in the Western Special
Military District during the first few days of Operation
Barbarossa as discussed in Chapter IV.
Given that all those individual events summarized in
Figure VI were discreet actions not specifically designed
to disrupt C"3 but rather to destroy or assist in the
destruction of the Red Army it should be intuitively evi-
dent that these activities individually, but to an even
greater degree, collectively, caused terrible disruption of
Soviet command, control, and communications as was clearly
evident in the case of the Soviet 4th Army described above.
Finally, one must remember that the massive, near
catastrophic disruption of command, control and communica-
tions within the Soviet 4th Army in particular but the
entire Red Army as well during Operation Barbarossa was the
result of no specific, concerted plan and occurred in a
time of relatively basic communications means and modest
information requirements. Consider the sophisticated,
sensitive communications and the voluminous information
requirements of a modern C system. The disruption possi-
bilities of a few well-trained saboteurs, or accurately
directed aircraft, or highly mobile, aggressive forces in a
surprise attack executing a well-designed, comprehensive,
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A DESCRIPTION OF THE SOVIET TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM DURING
OPERATION BARBAROSSA
A. THE RAIL NET (Sketch Map 2)
In 1941 the Russo-Polish border area between the Baltic
Sea and the Carpathian mountains was connected with
European Russia by four main westeast rail lines which
terminated in Leningrad, Moscow, the Donets Basin, and the
Black Sea port of Odessa. These lines were crossed by four
main north-south lines which connected Leningrad with
Odessa; Archangelsk with the Crimea; Moscow with the Donets
Basin; and Moscow with the Caucasus. This network was then
crossed by two diagonal lines extending from Koenigsberg
(Kaliningrad) to Kremenchug and from Riga to the Donets
Basin. In addition, this net connected with the Siberian
and Mongolian systems to the east and with the Murmansk
line to the north.
The main rail lines of European Russia were supplemen-
ted by a number of low-capacity branch, spur, and narrow
gauge lines. Most of the latter had been built to meet the
requirements of World War I. An overall view of the
Russian rail net gave the impression of a lack of uniform-
ity. In some places main lines were single-track for no
apparent reason. Often, construction apparently intended




There were three areas in which industrial development
had resulted in a certain density of trackage: the Donets
Basin, Moscow, and Leningrad. The following statistics may
serve to illustrate the density of the Russian rail net as
compared to that of Germany. In 1938 the USSR had but .65
miles of rail per 100 square miles, most of which was in
European Russia, where the average was 1.8 miles for the
same area. During the same year the German rail net aver-
aged twenty miles of rail per 100 square miles. Expressed
differently, Russia had 3.5 miles of trackage per 10,000
population; whereas Germany had 5.8 miles in the same year.
1. Railroad Plant
Since rock is scarce in Russia, few railroads had
beds of crushed rock ballast. In lieu of rock, sand and
gravel was widely used.
The prevailing gauge of Russian railways is five
feet, as compared to a gauge of four feet eight and one-
half inches, which is standard in most other countries.
This wider gauge provided more loading space per car and
compensated to some extent for the Russian shortage of
rolling stock and the limited capacity of the railway
lines
.
Marshalling yards, shunting installations, and turn
arounds (wyes instead of turntables) covered wide areas
because land was cheap. This dispersion was advantageous
in the event of air attack.
Signalling and safety devices, even on the main














used to designate the right -of -Kay . The Germans observed
electrically-operated devices only in the Moscow - Kharkov
line, which, incidentally, was the only line with a bed of
crushed-rock ballast.
The German invaders found that some of the railway
bridges in European Russia were temporary, having been
built during World War I. By German standards they were
unsafe and most of them could not have supported the
trains loaded with heavy tanks, which were in use during
the later years of World War II. On several of these
bridges the girders, made from sheet-metal, had been
riveted together.
For unknown reasons there were no double-track
bridges. Double-track lines which crossed rivers did so on
separate spans spaced 50 to 100 yards apart.
Much of the coal and water of European Russia is
unsuitable for use in locomotives without special proces-
sing. For instance, at Losovaya, a large rail junction
south of Kharkov, the Germans found a large tank of oil at
the coaling point in which coal from the Donets area had to
be soaked to render it usable. Between Dnepropetrovsk and
Stalino the water at each of the eleven watering points had
to be treated with different admixtures to prevent the
formation of boiler scales.
Along the Russo-Polish border, east of the Bug and
Niemen Rivers, the Russians had established a strip of no
man's land to deprive an invader of railroad facilities.
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This deficiency proved disadvantageous to the Germans




Russian locomotives were clasified by type similar-
ly to those in other countries. In addition, the Russians
used a rather complex condensor locomotive, the "Siberian,"
supposedly of American manufacture, which could cover up to
600 miles without taking on water.
Frequently, wood was used as fuel on secondary
lines, especially in the north.
In employing western European locomotives in Russia,
the Germans had to remember that in Russia water stations
are farther apart than in most other countries since
Russian locomotives have a greater water capacity. Through-
out the war the Germans converted Russian-guage freight cars
to normal gauge. The German State Railway developed
specially equipped shop trains with lifting devices which
permitted the change-over within a few minutes. However,
the gauge of the Russian locomotives could not be changed.
3. Personnel
Because of the vital role which the railroads
played in the national life, Russian railroad personnel
considered themselves a separate class within Russian
society. This feeling was expressed not only by pride in
their profession but also by a love for their work that led
them in times of stress to hide their tools from friend and
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foe alike in order to be able to go back to work the
moment traffic was resumed. Their technical proficiency
and willingness to work, even in the employ of the enemy,
were remarkable.
B. HIGHWAYS
1. Background of the Existing Highway Net
In 1941 European Russia did not have a highway
net comparable to those in western European countries. The
few roads which existed had only a limited capacity and
apprently had not undergone any appreciable change in con-
struction or lay-out during the past 100 years, a condition
due primarily to the relatively small demands of peacetime
traffic. There were two types of roads:
a. the long, straight thoroughfares intended
for commerical and military traffic, which
usually followed the valleys of the larger
rivers and connected cultural and industrial
areas
;
b. the unimproved roads which had developed
through constant use of the same route
connecting small settlements with nearby
fields and forests.
2. Condition and Capacity of Roads
In contrast to the former Baltic States where
paved roads were common, the roads in European Russia had
paved or asphalt surfacing only in and near large cities
and industrial centers. The only road which had been built
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according to western European standards and which was
given constant maintenance was the Minsk - Moscow highway.
The Germans designated this highway as Army Group Center's
"Rollbahn.
"
The terms "Tratke" or "Greter" were used to
refer to those through roads which cut straight across
country and were often more than 100 yards wide. In
summer these roads were extremely dusty. After a rain or
thaw they became so mired that they could not be used by
wheeled vehicles. Deep gullies cutting across these roads
were particularly troublesome. Attempts to overcome the
effects of weather by digging drainage ditches or by
rolling were of little help because the roads did not have
a hard top.
Source: Generalleutnant a.D
. Max Bark, Comments on Russian
Railroads and Highways (Unpublished Foreign Military Studies




A COPY OF A GERMAN PROPAGANDA LEAFLET
DISTRIBUTED ON 15 JULY 19 4T
FIGHTER OF THE RED ARMY
Your Marshal Timoschenko loudly proclaimed: "Anyone
talking of retreat will be shot!" Fighters, think it over,
why does your Marshal mention retreat at all ? He speaks of
retreat only, because the entire Red Army has already been
smashed.
Therefore, in order to save his own skin and that of
his comrades, the army commanders, he intends to drive the
sons of the Russian people treacherously into the fire of
the German guns and machine guns.
It is possible that your sacrifices would check the
advance of the German Army for a few hours, or a whole day,
but what then? Think it over carefully!
You know what little time it took the German Army to
destroy all obstacles and advance deep into the area of
Soviet Russia. Many of you were standing at the German
frontier. Where are you now?
Why all the sacrifices? Why all the bloodshed? Just
so that the Jews and their servants, your treacherous
government, can stay in power one day longer?
They are going to escape into foreign counties anyway,
cheir pocketbooks filled, in order to lead a carefree
existence there. But what about you?
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Death and destruction are awaiting you! And now think
it over yourselves and choose between annihilation, a
bloody death, or honorable captivity!
Every man who has fought hard in the ranks of his own
troops and surrenders just because he has realized that it
does not make sense to keep on fighting is entitled to
honorable captivity! That we promise you!
Source: Captain John Buchsbaum, German Psychological
Warfare on the Russian Front 1941-1945 (Typescript Office







OKH DEPLOYMENT DIRECTIVE OF 51.1.41
BARBARQSSA
1. TASK
In case Russia should change her present attitude to-
wards Germany, all preparations are to be completed, as
precautionary measures, to make it possible to defeat Soviet
Russia in a quick campaign even before the end of the war
against England. The operations should be so conducted
that the mass of the Russian army in Western Russia will be
destroyed by deep armoured thrusts. The withdrawal of
elements left intact into the depth of Russian space will
be prevented.
2. ENEMY SITUATION
It is assumed that the Russians will accept battle west
of the Dnieper and Dvina at least with strong parts of
their forces. They will make use of the partly strengthened
fortifications of the new and old frontiers and of the many
waterways which favour the defence. The Russian Command
will therefore have to make a particular effort to commit
sufficient forces to hold on as long as possible to its air
and naval bases in the Baltic provinces and to the flank
protection of the Black Sea. The unfavourable outcome of
the battles that may be expected south and north of the
Pripet Marshes will force the Russians to attempt to bring
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the German attack to a standstill on the Dneiper-Dvina line.
5. INTENTION
The first intention of the OKH within the task alloca-
ted is by means of swift and deep thrusts by strong mobile
formations north and south of the Pripet Marsh to tear open
the front of the mass of the Russian Army which it is
anticipated will be in western Russia. The enemy groups
separated by these penetrations will then be destroyed.
South of the Pripet Marshes Army Group ' South '- -Field-
Marshal von Rundstedt--will exploit the swift breakthrough
by strong armoured forces from the Lublin area in the
direction of Kiev, in order to cut the communications
across the Dneiper of the enemy in Galizia and the West
Ukraine. The Dnieper crossings at and below Kiev will be
taken, thus ensuring the freedom for the subsequent co-
operation of Army Group 'South' with the German forces
operating in northern Russia or for new tasks in south
Russ ia
.
North of the Pripet Marshes Army Group 'Centre' --
Field Marshal von Bock--will commit strong mobile forces
from the Warsaw-Sulwalki area to force a breakthrough
towards Smolensk. This will permit the turning of strong
formations to the north in order to cooperate with Army
Group ' North'
-
-Field Marshal von Leeb, attacking from East
Prussia in the general direction of Leningrad. Both army
groups will destroy the enemy formations in the Baltic area,
and, in co-operation with the Finnish Army and possible
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German forces from Norway, finally put an end to the
enemy's ability to resist in northern Russia, thus ensuring
freedom of movement for further tasks- -perhaps in co-
operation with the German forces in southern Russia. In
the event of a sudden unexpected collapse of enemy resis-
tance in northern Russia, the abandonment of the turning
movement and an immediate thrust towards Moscow could be
considered.
The opening of the attack will be co-ordinated along
the entire front (B-Day, Y-hour).
The Conduct of Operations will be based upon the princi-
ples proved in the Polish campaign. However, it must be
noted that, in spite of the clear concentration of force to
be achieved at decisive points, the enemy forces on other
sectors of the front must also be attacked. Only thus can
powerful enemy formations be prevented from withdrawing and
evading destruction west of the Dneiper-Dvina line.
Furthermore, the effect of the enemy Air Force must be
expected to be more strongly felt by the army, because the
full strength of the Luftwaffe will not be available for
the operations against Russia. Troops must be prepared for
the use by the enemy of chemical weapons from the air.
4. TASKS OF THE ARMY GROUPS AND ARMIES
a. Army Group 'South' will drive its strong left wing--
with mobile forces in the lead- -towards Kiev, destroy the
Russian forces in Galizia and in the West Ukraine while
they are still west of the Dneiper, and achieve the early
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capture of the Dnieper crossings at and below Kiev for the
continuation of operations both sides of the river. The
operation is to be conducted so that the mobile formations
from the Lublin area are concentrated for the breakthrough
towards Kiev. Within the framework of this instruction
Army Group 'South' headquarters will issue more detailed
directives to the armies and the Panzer Group for the
following tasks:
The 11th Army will protect the area of Rumania
vital to the German war economy against a breakthrough of
Russian forces. As part of the attack by Army Group 'South'
it will pin down the enemy forces on its sector by giving
an exaggerated impression of strength, and subsequently, in
co-operation with the Luftwaffe, it will prevent by means
of a close pursuit the orderly withdrawal of the Russians
across the Dnieper.
The first task of Panzer Group I will be in co-
operation with the 17th and 6th Armies to break through the
enemy forces near the frontier between Rawa Ruska and Kowel,
to advance Berdisheb-Zhitomir , and to reach the Dnieper as
soon as possible at and below Kiev. Then, under the
direction of Army Group Headquarters, it will continue the
attack in a south-easterly direction along the Dnieper in
order to prevent a withdrawal of the enemy in the West




The 17th Army will break through the enemy border
defences north-west of Lemberg (Lvov) . By means of a
vigorous advance on its strong left wing, it must attempt
to push the enemy back south-eastwards. In addition, the
army will take advantage of the advance of the Panzer
Group quickly to reach the area Vinnitsa-Berditchev so
that according to the situation it can contiune the attack
to the south-east or east.
The 6th Army will break through the enemy front
both sides of Luck in co-operation with elements of the
Panzer Group I. While covering the north flank of the
army group against interference from the Pripet Marsh area,
it will follow the Panzer Group I to Zhitomir with all
possible speed and strength. It must be ready, on the
orders of Army Group 'South' headquarters, to turn south-
eastwards with strong forces west of the Dnieper, in
order to co-operate with Panzer Group I in preventing the
enemy in the West Ukraine from withdrawing over the
Dneiper
.
b. Army Group 'Centre' will break up the enemy in
White Russia by driving forward the strong forces on its
wings. It will quickly win the area around Smolensk by
uniting the mobile forces advancing north and south of
Minsk and so achieve the prerequisites for co-operation
between strong elements of its mobile troops and Army
Group 'North* in the destruction of the enemy forces fight-
ing in the Baltic states and the Leningrad area.
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Within the framework of this instruction Army Group
'Centre* headquarters will issue more detailed directives
to the Panzer groups and armies for the following tasks :
Panzer Group 2 in co-operation with 4th Army will
break through the enemy forces on the frontier at and north
of Kobryn. By means of a swift advance to Slutsk and Minsk
it will meet Panzer Group 3 advancing from the area north
of Minsk and achieve the prerequisites for the destruction
of the enemy forces between Bialystok and Minsk. In close
contact with Panzer Group 5, it will quickly achieve the
further tasks of winning the area around and south of
Smolensk, preventing the concentration of enemy forces in
the upper Dneiper region and so preserve the army group's
freedom in the choice of subsequent tasks.
Panzer Group 3 in co-operation with 9th Army will
break through the enemy forces on the frontier. By means
of a swift advance in the area north of Minsk, it will meet
Panzer Group 2 advancing from the south-west towards Minsk
and achieve the prerequisites for the destruction of the
enemy forces between Bialystok and Minsk. In close contact
with Panzer Group 2 it will quickly achieve the further task
of reaching the area around and north of Vitebsk, preventing
the concentration of enemy forces in the upper Dvina region
and so preserve the army group's freedom in the choice of
subsequent tasks.
4th Army will achieve the crossing of the Bug and
thereby will open the way to Minsk for Panzer Group 2. It
will advance with its main strength across the Shava River
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south of Slonim, and in co-operation with 9th Army it will
take advantage of the advance of the Panzer Groups and
destroy the enemy forces between Bialystok and Minsk. Its
further tasks will be: to follow the advance of Panzer
Group 2 and, protecting its south flank against [attacks
from] the Pripet Marshes; to seize crossings over the
Beresina between Bobruisk and Borysau; and to reach the
Dnieper at and north of Mohilev.
9th Army in co-operation with Panzer Group 3 will
break through the enemy forces west and north of Grodno.
With the main weight on its north wing it will drive to-
wards Lida-Vilna, and, taking advantage of the advance of
the Panzer Groups it will establish contact with the 4th
Army and destroy the enemy in the area between Bialystok
and Minsk. The next task of the 9th Army will be to follow
Panzer Group 5 and reach the Dvina at and south-east of
Polozk.
c. Army Group 'North' will destroy the enemy forces
fighting in the Baltic area, and will deprive the Russian
fleet of its bases by occupying the Baltic harbours in-
cluding Leningrad and Kronstadt. At the appropriate time
the OKH will order powerful mobile forces from Army Group
'Centre' advancing on Smolensk to co-operate with Army
Group 'North'. Within the framework of this task Army
Group 'North' will break through the enemy front with its
main effort towards Dvinsk. It will drive its strong
right wing with mobile troops thrusting across the Dvina
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as quickly as possible to reach the area north-west of
Opotschka and so prevent the withdrawal of battle-worthy
Russian forces eastward from the Baltic region. It will
also achieve the conditions for a further swift drive
towards Leningrad.
Panzer Group 4 in co-operation with 16th and 18th
Armies will break through the enemy front between Wystiter
Lake and the Tils it -Schaulen highway, and will thrust to
the Dvina at and below Dvinsk and establish bridgeheads
across the river. Furthermore, Panzer Group 4 will be
required to reach the area north-east of Opotschka in order
to be able to drive on north-eastward or northwards accord-
ing to the situation.
16th Army in co-operation with Panzer Group 4 will
break through the enemy with its main effort on both sides
of the road Ebenrode-Kovno , and by rapidly advancing its
strong right wing behind the Panzer corps it will reach the
north bank of the Dvina at and below Dvinsk.
The next task of the army will be to follow Panzer
Group 4 and to reach the Opotschka area as soon as possible.
18th Army will break through the enemy on its
sector with its main concentration on and east of the Tilsit
Riga highway, and will cut off and destroy the enemy forces
south-west of Riga by swiftly thrusting most of its forces
over the Dvina at and below Stockmannshof . It will then
block the approach of Russian forces south of Lake Peipus
by means of a swift advance to the line Ostrov-Pskov, and
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in accordance with the directive of Army Group 'North' --
possibly in co-operation with mobile troops north of Lake
Peipus--mop up the enemy in Estonia. Preparations are to
be made so that the surprise occupation of the Baltic
Islands of Oesel, Dago, and Moon can be carried out as soon
as the situation permits.
5. pp. [Spare]
6. TASK FOR THE ARMY OF NORWAY (directly subordinate to
the OKW)
:
a. The most important task remains to ensure the
security of the entire Norwegian area not only against
raids, but also against the serious attempts at landings
by the British which must be expected in the course of this
summer. This task requires that:
i. all energies and means of transport will be
used to ensure that the batteries earmarked to
strengthen the coastal defences will be instal-
led by mid-May.
ii. formations at present located in Norway will
not be appreciably weakened for the achievement
of tasks connected with operation 'Barbarossa '
.
Indeed, the sector most endangered- -Kirkenes
-
Narvik- -will be strengthened. This reinforce-




b. In addition to its defensive role the Army of
Norway has the following tasks:
i. advance into the Petsamo area at the start of
the main operations, or if necessary even
earlier, and, together with the Finnish forces,
defend it against attacks from the land, sea,
and air. Particular significance is attached
to the safeguarding of the nickel mines, which
are important to the German war industry
(Operation 'Reindeer'),
ii. Envelop, and later, when sufficient assault
forces are available, capture Murmansk as a
base for offensive action by its land, sea, and
air forces (Operation 'Silver Fox'). It is to
be expected that Sweden will maintain the




At the start of the operation the reserves of the OKH
will be allocated to a large group in the area Reichhof
and east of Warsaw and to small groups in the Zamosc,
Suwalki, and Eydtkau area.
8. SUPPORT BY THE LUFTWAFFE AND NAVY
The task of the Luftwaffe is to eliminate as far as
possible all interference by the Russian Air Force and to
support the main operations of the Army especially those of
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Army Group 'Centre' and the left wing of Army Group
'South'. During the main operations the Luftwaffe will
concentrate all force against the enemy Air Force and in
immediate support of the Army. Attacks against the enemy
industry will be carried out only after the operational
objectives of the Army have been attained.
Air support is allocated as follows:
Air Fleet 4 - Army Group 'South'
Air Fleet 2 - Army Group 'Centre'
Air Fleet 1 - Army Group 'North*
In the course of conducting its main role against Britain
and safeguarding our coasts, the Navy will prevent enemy
naval forces from breaking out of the Baltic. Until the
Russian fleet has been deprived of its last Baltic base at
Leningrad, major naval objectives will be avoided. After
the elimination of the Russian fleet, the Navy will have
the task of safeguarding sea traffic in the Baltic and the
supply of the north wing of the Army.
9. THE PARTICIPATION OF OTHER STATES
The active participation of Rumania and Finland in a
war against the Soviet Union is to be anticipated on the
flanks of the operation. The form of the co-operation and
of the subordination of the forces of both countries under
German command will be decided upon at the appropriate time.
Rumania's task will be to assist the German forces concen-
trated there in pinning down the enemy facing them, and also
to provide assistance in the rear areas.
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Finland's tasks will be to eliminate the Russian base
at Hango* and to cover the concentration of the German
forces in north Finland. By the time Army Group 'North'
has crossed the Dvina Finland will also attack the Russian
forces on her south-east front in accordance with the
requirements of the OKH, concentrating either east or west
of Lake Ladoga, preferably the former. She will then
support Army Group 'North' in the destruction of the enemy.
The active participation of Sweden is probably not to be
expected. It is possible, however, that Sweden will permit
the use of her railways for the concentration and supply of
the German forces in North Finland.
Signed: von Brauchitsch
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